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PART I: FIRST PARTY COMMON LAW BAD FAITH
I. INTRODUCTION

Insurance can be classified as first party or third party. First party
insurance involves only two parties: the insurance carrier and its insured. Third
party insurance involves the insurance carrier, its insured, and a third party
claimant. This introductory section will examine common law insurance company
claim misconduct in first party insurance transactions. A claim of insurance
company claim misconduct in first party insurance transactions arises when an
insurance company engages in practices that harm its own insured. These practices
include, but are not limited to, refusing to pay a legitimate claim, delaying a claim,
undervaluing a claim, deceiving its insured, misinterpreting policy provisions, or
engaging in many other types of misconduct.' Insurance is purchased for
protection. Thus, when an insurance company engages in conduct that not only
does not protect its insured, but in fact harms him, then the insurance company is
liable for this misconduct.
West Virginia is unique: it is the only state that does not require proof of
wrongful conduct on the part of the insurer in an insurance company misconduct
claim. In Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,2 the Supreme Court of
West Virginia held that an insured may recover whenever a policyholder
substantially prevails against its insurer regardless of good faith or bad faith.' Once
it has been decided that the insurer breached its contract with its insured, then the
insured should not have to bear the burden of the cost of enforcing the insurer's
contractual obligation.4 An insured buys insurance for protection, not for a lawsuit
with the insurer.
II. HISTORY

A.

National

The first type of remedy recognized for an insurer's misconduct was a
contract action. An insurance policy is a contract and is, therefore, governed by
contract law. When an insurer is guilty of misconduct, it then breaches the contract
and the insured can recover damages using contract theories. The key landmark
case to determine the amount of damages recoverable in a breach of contract action

1
2

For a more extensive list of insurance company misconduct see infra text accompanying note 51.
352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).

3

Id. at 80.

4

Id
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is Hadley v. Baxendale.s In this case, the English Court held that damages
recoverable for a breach of contract are limited to those reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract is entered.' For an insured to
recover damages for breach of a contract with the insured, the damages must be
foreseeable.
Contract law was inadequate to deal with an insurer's claim of misconduct.
First, the bargaining power between an insurance company and an insured was
unequal. "The philosophy underlying contract law presuppose[d] dealings among
equals." 7 Insurance companies were powerful financial entities, and the insured,
lacking such resources, relied upon his insurance carrier to fairly compensate for
his loss. Second, contract actions were subject to many technical defenses.' Also,
because of the doctrine of efficient breach, contract law was insufficient to deal
with an insurer's wrongful refusal to pay first party claims. "[T]he oracles of the
common law, including great and distinguished judges such as Oliver Wendell
Holmes, legal scholars, and law professors.., have, for many years, taught that it
is not in-and-of-itself morally impermissible to breach a contract."' On the
contrary, these scholars have taught that it is either morally neutral or economically
efficient to breach a contract.' Lay-people do not follow this doctrine, because they
believe that contracts are promises that are not to be broken. However, companies
that are involved in finance have subscribed to this doctrine when it satisfies their
purpose. After all, that is what legal scholars learned in law school." Finally,
contract law was insufficient because consequential damages based upon
foreseeability were difficult to prove. The insured's main reason for purchasing
insurance was to guard against unpredictable risks and their consequences.
However, consequential damages must have been within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of contracting. Thus, the main reason for obtaining insurance
was the same reason that made obtaining consequential damages so difficult. In
addition, punitive damages were not recoverable in contract actions, so insurance
companies could engage in malicious conduct without fear of punishment.
Because contract law was inadequate to deal with insurer misconduct, the
tort of bad faith was developed. 2 It was first recognized in third party insurance. 3

9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
6

Id.

Common Law Insurer Bad Faith: Purpose, Promise, and Problems, INS. LITIGATION RPTR., Aug.
15, 1997, at 487.
8

Id.
Id. at 488.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Common Law Insurer Bad Faith: Purpose, Promise, and Problems, INS. LITIGATION RPTR., Aug.

15, 1997, at 487.
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The tort of bad faith for breach of an insurer's obligation in the area of first party
insurance was first recognized in 1973 in Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co.1" In
Gruenberg, the California Supreme Court held that the insurer's duties to act in
good faith in handling the claims of third parties against the insured and the claims
of its own insured were merely two facets of the same duty:15
That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the terms
of the policy itself - to defend, settle, or pay. It is the obligation,
deemed to be imposed by law, under which the insurer must act
fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual
responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal fairly and in
good faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to
compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such
conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
The court extended the tort of bad faith already recognized in third party
claims to first party claims. The tort of bad faith has four elements: "(1) the
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing, (2) breach of that duty through (3) bad
faith conduct by the insurer, i.e., 'the absence of a reasonable basis for denying
benefits of the policy and the [insurer's] knowledge or reckless disregard of the
lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, "7 and (4) damages resulting from
the insurer's bad faith conduct."18 The main aspect of a claim for insurance
company misconduct is unreasonableness in processing insurance claims.
B.

West VirginiaHistory
1. Contract

West Virginia also recognized that contract law was inadequate to deal
with insurance company misconduct. Not only is there unequal bargaining power
between the insured and his insurance company, but West Virginia courts also limit
the amount of damages recoverable in contract actions to the policy benefits plus

13

Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).

14

510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).

is

Id.at 575.

16

Id. at 573-74.

17

Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978).

Linda Gay, Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Claims, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
579, 596 (1980).
18
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interest." However, more recently, West Virginia courts have extended damages
recoverable in contract actions to include compensatory damages incurred as a
result of the insurer's breach of its contractual duty.2' These damages are limited to
those that
may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally that is, according to the usual course of things - from the breach
of the contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they
made the contract, as the probable result of its breach.2
As mentioned earlier, these damages are difficult to prove. An action under
contract law also does not allow the insured to recover damages for mental
suffering or punitive damages in West Virginia.'
2. Extra-Contractual Liability
The first mention of insurance company claim misconduct in the first party
context was in 1977 in Justice Neely's prescient concurrence in Jarrett v. E.L.
Harper & Son, Inc.' In Jarrett,even though the court held that annoyance and
inconvenience were proper elements of damages in property damage cases, Justice
Neely went even further.' In his concurrence, he referred to the ability of people
with property damage to sue for inconvenience and annoyance as "an act of divine
justice."' s He realized that the many complex issues involved in insurance disputes
must ultimately be worked out on a case by case basis, developing a new body of
law which he hoped would make dealings among people far more equitable.' This
statement by Justice Neely, in effect, predicted the development of the tort of
insurance company claim misconduct in first party insurance.
Writing in the 1980 West Virginia Law Review, Linda Gay proposed that
the tort of insurance company claim misconduct applies to first party insurance.'
She stated that an insured's economic and emotional well-being is severely
1*

Rubenstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 118W. Va. 367, 190 S.E. 531 (1937).

20

Kentucky Fried Chicken of Morgantown, Inc. v. Sellaro, 214 S.E.2d 823, 827 (W. Va. 1975)

(citing 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 56 (1965)).
21

Id.

22

See generally Short v. Grange Mut Casualty Co., 307 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).

23

235 S.E.2d 362 (IV. Va. 1977).

24

Id. at 366.

25

Id.

28

Id.

27

See generally Gay, supra note 18.
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endangered when his insurer wrongfully denies or delays payment of a valid
claim." She described how inadequate the existing judicial, statutory, and
contractual remedies were to compensate the wronged insured. 9 She argued how
the recognition of the tort of insurance company claim misconduct would "destroy
the climate in which such wrongdoing [insurance company denying its insureds
policy benefits and forcing the insured to go to court and pay high fees] may now
flourish." 3 The Supreme Court in West Virginia took Linda Gay's
recommendations to heart.
In 1986, the West Virginia Supreme Court first recognized insurance
company misconduct in first party insurance claims in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas., a typical arson case where the failing company caught on fire in the
middle of the night. When the insureds filed their claim for property damage with
the insurance company, the insurer declined to pay on the grounds of arson. 2 In
deciding this case, the Court did not use good faith and fair dealing as the standard
for insurance company conduct. The standard used was more strict. The Court
stated that "whether an insurer's refusal to defend was in good or bad faith is
largely irrelevant once it has been established that the insurer breached its contract
with its insured ....

In either case, the insured is out his consequential damages

and attorney's fees." 33 The Court established a strict liability standard in which the
insurer is liable for reasonable attorney fees and consequential damages if the
insured substantially prevails. The concepts of "reasonable, unreasonable,
wrongful, good faith and bad faith" have no bearing on this determination.'
III. NATIONAL LAW NORMS

In 1973 the landmark case of Gruenberg was decided in California.'

There, the California Supreme Court created a contract good faith and fair dealing
as the standard for insurance company claim misconduct.' Since the Gruenberg
decision, at least twenty-four states have adopted some type of tort for insurance
company claim misconduct. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi,

28

Id. at 609.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 610.

31

352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).

32

Id.

33

Id. at 79.

3

Id. at 80.

35

510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).

38

Id. at 575.
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Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 7
Additionally, the highest courts of New Hampshire, Utah, and West Virginia have
recognized the right to recover extra-contractual damages using expanded versions
for damages under breach of contract? Two other states, Florida and Pennsylvania,
have enacted statutes that create causes of actions against insurers for acts
constituting bad faith. 9 With the exception of West Virginia, all of these thirty
states require proof of wrongful conduct in order for the insured to obtain damages
in excess of the policy benefits' These jurisdictions, however, vary on what type
of wrongful conduct is considered "misconduct."'"
The prototypical situation of insurance company misconduct involves the
refusal of an insurer to pay a claim despite its knowledge that there was no
reasonable basis for denying it. This type of situation fits the definition of an
intentional tort because the insurer knows it is causing harm to its insured by not
paying a legitimate claim. The test for insurance company claim misconduct,
however, is not limited to this situation because insurance companies rarely intend
to harm their insured."2 This test includes a broader standard of culpability, which
varies in each jurisdiction.
In 1978, the most famous case that defined insurance company claim
misconduct was Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co..4 ' Anderson extended
insurance company claim misconduct to include not only situations where an
insurer knew it had no legitimate basis for denying a claim, but also to situations
where an insurer "recklessly" disregarded the rights of its claimant." "Even
though an insurer does not actually know that it has no legitimate basis for denying
a claim, the insurer may still be liable if there is a high probability that it did not
have a reasonable basis and the insurer is either: (1) aware of this fact or (2) has
information that would put a reasonable insurer on notice of this fact."4 Of the
thirty states that recognize insurance company claim misconduct, at least ten appear
to follow the test set out in Anderson.' Also, two other jurisdictions have expanded
7

Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First Party Insurance Transaction After Two

Decades,37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1153, 1153-54 (1995).
38a

Id. at 1155.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 1156.

41

Id.

42

Id.at 1157.

43,

271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).

44

Id. at 376-77.

45

See Henderson, supra note 37, at 1157.

46

Id. at 1158. The states that follow this test are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky,
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the basis of culpability to include "gross negligence,"" 7 and maybe as many as
three jurisdictions have extended the tort to include mere negligent conduct. '
Finally, one state holds that an insurer may be liable without regard to fault when
the insured substantially prevails. 9
The normal fact situation in which insurance companies are held liable for
claim misconduct in first party insurance involves the refusal to pay or delay in
paying the policy benefits." Insurance companies are also liable for this tort in
many other situations:
Courts have recognized that an insurer is subject to liability for
attempting to deceive an insured, misinterpreting records or policy
provisions for the purpose of defeating coverage, using undue
threats to force an insured to agree to an unfair settlement, falsely
accusing an insured of wrongdoing, exploiting an insured's
vulnerable position, making oppressive demands not required
under the policy, conditioning payment of an undisputed portion
of a claim on settlement of a disputed portion, unfairly imposing a
premium increase in retaliation for filing a claim, destroying
evidence that would support the insured's claim for benefits,
relying on evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, wrongfully
refusing to defend its insured against a liability claim by a third
party, and refusing to pay a third-party tort claimant who has
obtained a final judgment against its insured."
There are other instances not involving a claim for policy benefits where
an insurer is liable for claim misconduct. These instances are not as common, and
they all illustrate that "the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing is not
limited to a violation of specific policy provisions."5 2 These include situations
when an insurer wrongfully fails to renew policies of insurance even though there
were no express obligations to do so under the contract, when an insurer abuses it

Nebraska, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See id.; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1986); Jessen v. National
Excess Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1247 (N.M. 1989).

47

See Henderson, supra note 37, at 1158; Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio
1994); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 620 (S.C. 1983); Aranda v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
48

Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986).
50

Henderson, supra note 37, at 1159.

51

Id. at 1159-60.

s2

Id. at I160-61.

53

Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354, 1362-64 (Colo. 1993).
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subrogation rights, ' when an insurer issues retrospective premium policies," and
when an insurer does not provide the insured a copy of an investigation report
regarding a claim for a fire loss.'
Additionally, even less common fact situations give rise to a cause of
action for insurance company claim misconduct. Two in particular warrant
attention because of their effect of expanding this tort. The first of these involves
the duty of an insurer to inform its insured of rights under a policy. The second
kind of case deals with insurers who engage in fraudulent conduct "to actively
mislead the insured with regard to a claim that the insurer was processing."' In this
area the insurer is liable for claim misconduct for engaging in wrongful claim
process.' Cases in these two areas are rare, but their existence may cause other
jurisdictions to follow this lead and expand the tort of insurance company claim
misconduct.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA OVERVIEW

The following section will discuss in chronological order the cases in West
Virginia on insurance company misconduct in the first party context.
A.

Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.5"

In this fire insurance case, the plaintiff, the insured, sued the defendant, the
insurer, for policy proceeds and extra contractual damages."0 The insurer denied
payment on the grounds of arson. The court found that bad faith has no place in
the law of property damage insurance cases. 2 It determined that when the insured
substantially prevails in a suit against an insurer, then the insured is entitled to
attorney fees and consequential damages. 3 The insured may also obtain an award
of punitive damages if he can prove "actual malice.""

54

Brunet v. American Ins. Co., 660 F. Supp. 843 (D. Vt. 1987).

55

Security Officers Serv., Inc. v. State Compensation Fund, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1993).

56

Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986).

so

Henderson, supra note 37, at 1163.
Id. at 1164.

59

177 W.Va. 323,352 S.E.2d 73 (1986)

60

Id. at 75.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 80.

63

Id. at 81.

6

Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80-81.

5
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Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.6"

In this property insurance case, the insured's house was damaged by
blasting, and the insured sued the blaster and the insured's homeowner's insurer in
one action. Both of the defendants denied the insured's claim.' A pretrial
conference resulted in a settlement with the blaster, which was credited toward the
insured's compensatory damage award at trial." The court found: (1) The insurer's
denial of the insured's claim foreclosed its subrogation claim and was not an accord
and satisfaction;68 (2) Bifurcation is not required, but it is permissive and
discretional on the part of the trial court under Rule 42(c); 9 (3) Breach of good
faith and punitive damages are proper;7" (4) Amending the ad damnum clause to
conform to the verdict is proper;71 and (5) Prejudgment interest on policy proceeds
is proper, and prejudgment interest on insurance company claim misconduct
damages is not proper.7 The case was tried ten months prior to Hayseeds, but the
Circuit Court's instructions were in accordance with the principles in Hayseeds.'
C.

Weese v. Nationwide Ins. Co.'

Insureds brought action in federal court against an uninsured motorist
carrier for breach of contract, tortuous bad faith, and unfair trade practices.7 The
Court found that the insurer owed the insured a contractual duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and was subject to the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act. 6 It
determined, however, that there was no cause of action in tort for bad faith in first
party insurance, only in third party insurance.'

69

181 W.Va. 168, 381 S.E.2d 367 (1989)

66

Id. at 370.

67

Id.

68

Id. at372.

69

Id. at373.

70

Berry, 382 S.E.2d at 373.

71

Id. at 376.

72

Id. at377.

73

Id. at 375.

74

879 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1989).

75

Id. at 116.

76

Id. at117.

77

Id.at 120.
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Thomas v. State FarmMut. Auto Ins. Co.78

This case involved an automobile accident in which the insurer delayed in
settling the claim and undervalued the claim. The damages were approximately
equal to the amount sought by the insured." The trial court found that the insured
had substantially prevailed, and it awarded him attorney's fees." The Court held:
(1) the substantally prevailed standard from Hayseeds also applies when the insurer
makes a low (not just no) offer;81 (2) the insured is under no obligation to accept an
unreasonable settlement offer (not mitigation of damages);' and (3) whether an
insured substantially prevails is determined at the time the negotiations break
down. 3 "Where the insurance company has offered an amount materially below
the damage estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the insured an
amount approximating the insured's damage estimates, the insured has
substantially prevailed.""
E.

Jordanv. NationalGrange Mut. Ins. Co.8"

The insured's business was destroyed by a fire, and a settlement with the
insurer was reached for the full policy proceeds. A dispute arose as to the amount
of attorney's fee because the settlement was silent on this matter. The court found
that the substantially prevailed standard does not require a jury verdict.8 To recover
attorney's fees, the insured must show that "but for his or her attorney's services
such settlement would not have been reached." 87 The amount of attorney's fees is
determined by the twelve factors in Pitrolo
F.

FirstbankShinnston v. West Virginia Insurance Co.8"

78

181 W. Va. 604, 383 S.E.2d 786 (1989).

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.at 789.

82

Id.at 790.

83

Thomas, 383 S.E.2d at 790.

85

Id.at 790-91.
183 W. Va. 9,393 S.E.2d 647 (1990).

86

Id.at 652.

87

Id.

88

Id.
185 W. Va. 754,408 S.E.2d 777 (1991).
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The lender under a deed of trust brought an action against a fire insurer to
recover policy proceeds and Hayseeds damages as a loss payee under the policy's
standard mortgage clause." In this case, the Court considered the lender an
insured" who was entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the principles stated in
92
Hayseeds.
G.

D 'Annunzio v. Security-ConnecticutLife93

This was an action to determine the plaintiffs rights under a life insurance
policy. The plaintiffs were claiming that the principle of Hayseeds applied to life
insurance. The defendant insurance company argued that Hayseeds was fact bound
to property damage cases only. The court agreed with the plaintiff and extended
Hayseeds to life insurance.'
H.

Smithson v. United States. Fidelity & GuarantyCo.9"

The insured made a claim for the value of his insured truck after it was
destroyed in a gas well explosion. The insured and insurer could not agree as to the
value of the property, so it was submitted to appraisal.' The insured sued the
insurer, alleging that it acted in bad faith by failing to settle his claim promptly."
The court found that the Hayseeds substantially prevailed standard also applies to
appraisal proceedings.98
L

Arndt v. Burdette"

This case involved a consent-to-settle provision pertaining to the
underinsured motorists coverage of an automobile insurance policy. The insured
settled with the tortfeasor with the insurer's written consent to settle." The court
stated that "if an insurer acts unreasonably in refusing to give written consent to
90

Id. at 777.

91

Id. at 784.

92

Id. at 785.

93

186 W. Va. 39, 410 S.E.2d 275 (1991)

94

Id. at 279.

95

186 W. Va. 195, 411 S.E.2d 850 (1991).

6

Id. at 853.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 858.

99

189 W. Va. 722,434 S.E2d 394 (1993).

100

Id. at 397.
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settle, that insurer may be subjecting itself to a bad faith claim."1 . However, in this
case, the Court determined that the insurer did not act unreasonably. 2
J

Marshallv. Saseen0 '

The plaintiffs sued their own insurance company for bad faith failure to
settle their underinsured claim. The insurance company argued that there was no
such thing as first party bad faith. The Court found that (1) underinsured motorist
coverage constitutes first party insurance;" ° (2) Hayseeds applies to all first party
insurance;..5 and (3) Hayseeds applies to underinsured motorist coverage."
K

Morrison v. Haynes"°7

The administrator of the insured's estate brought an action to recover
uninsured motorist benefits. The Court found that an uninsured or underinsured
motorist carrier who acts in bad faith is a joint tortfeasor and is entitled to setoff
other payments, so that its liability for a verdict in excess of policy limits is reduced
by the amount of other uninsured benefits paid on behalf of the tortfeasor. 1°8
L.

Hadornv. Shea'
This case involved an underinsured motorist claim in which the insured

demanded $300,000. The insurer offered $22,500, and the jury awarded $90,000.11

The court held that the insured did not substantially prevail. It did not base the
decision on a purely mathematical calculation."' Instead, it "considered the status
of the claim at the time negotiations broke down, which included consideration of
the insured's interest in attempting to settle before trial.""' 2 The "insured must

101

Id. at 400 n.10.

102

Id.

103

192 W. Va. 94,450 S.E.2d 791 (1994).

104

Id. at 797.

105

.

106

Id.

107

192 W. Va. 303,452 S.E.2d 394 (1994).

108

ld.

109

193 W.Va. 350,456 S.E.2d 194 (1995).

110

Id. at 196.

III

Id. at 198.

112

Id.
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show that but for his or her attorney's services such settlement would not have been
reached." 3
M

4

Jones v. Westbanco Bank Parkersburg"

The mortgagee on the homeowner's insurance policy wanted a
determination that it suffered a loss as of the date of the fire, even though the
mortgagors continued to make monthly payments on the debt."' The Court held
that the mortgagee is a full-fledged insured who is entitled to be paid at the time of
the loss. " 6 Failure to pay the mortgagee at the time of the loss obligated the insurer
to pay Hayseeds damages." 7
N.

Burgess v. Porterfield"8

The insurer brought a suit against an uninsured motorist and an
establishment that served alcoholic beverages to that motorist. The insurer offered
$50,000, which was one-half of the policy limit. The jury awarded $136,000. " 9 The
Court determined that the insured substantially prevailed.2" The Court also held
that when compensatory and punitive damages are awarded, the defendant is
entitled to a reduction by the amount of good faith compensatory settlements
previously made with the plaintiff by other jointly liable parties.2 '
0.

q)
State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Canaday

The uninsured motorist carrier wanted to appear in its own name instead of
in the name of the uninsured tortfeasor. The court determined that the uninsured
carrier could appear in its own name rather than that of the uninsured tortfeasor.'
It also held that an uninsured motorist carrier owes its insured an obligation of good

113

Id.

114

194 W. Va. 381,460 S.E.2d 627 (1995).

115

Id. at 627.

116

Id. at634.

117

Id. at635-36.

118

196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).

119

Id.at117.

120

Id. at123.

121

Id. at121.

122

197 W. Va. 107, 475 S.E.2d 107 (1996).

123

Id. at110.
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faith and fair dealing.12'
P.

McCormick v. Allstate Insurance Co."

The insured brought an action against his car insurer to recover
compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and punitive damages for the insurer's low
settlement offer for the loss of the car. To determine that the insured had not
substantially prevailed and was not entitled to Hayseeds damages, the court
compared the jury verdict of $995 to the insured's demand of various amounts
ranging from $250,000 to $250,000,000.2
Q.

Landmark Baptist Church v. BrotherhoodMutual Insurance Co.'

The insured brought an action against his property insurer that had refused
to pay a claim for property damage. In determining whether the award of attorney's
fees was reasonable and proper, the Court found that the twelve factors in Pitrolo
are to be used to determine whether attorney's fees are proper. 28 It found that when
the insured submits the fee arrangement between his attorney and detailed
descriptions of the services performed, then the trial court has sufficient
information to determine the reasonableness of the attorney's fees.
R.

Miller v. Fluharty

An insured sued his insurance carrier to recover attorney's fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest because it would not pay the policy limits of the
underinsured's motorist policy. In determining that the insured substantially
prevailed, the Court modified the standard. It stated that the "totality of the
policyholder's negotiations with the insurance carrier, not merely the status of
negotiations before and after a lawsuit is filed," is used to determine whether a
policyholder has substantially prevailed.'31 The insured did not recover prejudgment
interest on the award of attorney's fees and costs because these amounts were not
"ascertainable, pecuniary, out-of-pocket expenditures to the plaintiff that support

124

Id.at115.

125

197 W. Va. 415,475 S.E.2d 507 (1996).

126

Id. at 516.

127

199 W. Va. 312,484 S.E.2d 195 (1997).

128

Id.at 198.

129

Id. at 198-99.

130

201 W. Va. 685, 500 S.E.2d 310 (1997).

131

Id. at 321.
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an award of prejudgment interest."132
V. WEST VIRGINIA CAUSE OF ACTION
Four sequential steps are needed to prove a first party common law cause
of action for insurance claim misconduct in West Virginia: (1) the underlying claim
must have been ultimately resolved; (2) the insured must have substantially
prevailed; (3) the insurer must have acted in bad faith; and (4) the insurer must
have acted with actual malice. This section outlines each of these steps.
A.

The Underlying Claim Must Have Been Ultimately Resolved

The first sequential step is that the insured must prevail in his policy claim.
All that the plaintiff / insured must do is prove the legitimacy of his policy claim.
For example, the insurer may outright deny the claim as in Hayseeds," may
lowball as in Thomas," or may delay as in Miller.'35 In Hayseeds, the insurance
company claimed arson and declined to pay policy proceeds for a fire." The
plaintiff was forced to sue the insurer and won at trial. In other words, the plaintiff
prevailed. When the plaintiff prevails, he is entitled to policy proceeds. 3 '
B.

The Insured Must Have SubstantiallyPrevailed

The second sequential step is to substantially prevail. West Virginia is the
only state that has established the unique rule of "substantially prevailed" in first
party insurance company claim misconduct cases. 3' The substantially prevailed
rule originated in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas."' The substantially
prevailed standard was adopted to induce insurance companies to settle claims
fairly and promptly. 4 ' Under this standard, if the insured is forced to sue his
insurer, then he is entitled to a low threshold of damages.'" This will promote
132

Id. at 325.

133

Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).

134

Thomas v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989).

135

Miller v. Fluharty, 500 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1997).

136

Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 75.

W. VA. CODE § 56-6-31 (1997); Miller, 500 S.E.2d at 325-26 (holding prejudgment interest not
recoverable on attorney's fees and costs because these expenses are not ascertainable, pecuniary, or out-ofpocket); Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 381 S.E.2d 367, 377 (W. Va. 1989).
137

138

Henderson, supranote 37, at 1155.

139

352 S.E.2d at 80.

140

Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.

141
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prompt, fair, and equitable settlements. The substantially prevailed rule provides
that whenever a policyholder must sue his own insurance company over any
property damage claim, and the policyholder substantially prevails in the action, the
company is liable for the payment of the policyholder's reasonable attorneys' fees,
damages for net economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, as well as an
award for aggravation and inconvenience. 42 West Virginia automatically awards
policyholders these types of damages when the policyholder substantially
prevails." Thus, when an insurer denies policy claims in West Virginia, it does so
at its own peril. No proof of wrongful conduct is required, only proof that the
policyholder substantially prevailed. This results in strict liability for insurance
companies who deny, lowball, or delay claims.
1.

How does a court determine whether an insured substantially
prevailed?

This is a most difficult question. West Virginia has not established a bright
line rule to determine whether an insured substantially prevails. Instead, the court
has enunciated a vague standard that has led to much uncertainty." The
14 6
substantially prevailed standard is illustrated by four cases: Hayseeds," Thomas,
Hadorn,147 and Miller."'8
Hayseeds first introduced the concept of substantially prevailed, but did
not define how to determine it. Thomas was the first case to define substantially
prevailed. According to Thomas v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Ins. Co.,
whether the insured has substantially prevailed against his
insurance company on a property damage claim is determined by
the status of the negotiations between the insured and the insurer
prior to the institution of the lawsuit. Where the insurance
company has offered an amount materially below the damage
estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the
insured an amount approximating the insured's damage estimates,

142

Id.

143

Id.

The court has enunciated different ways of determining whether an insured has substantially
prevailed in the following cases: Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va.1986); Thomas, 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va.
1989); Hadorn,456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995); and Miller, 500 S.E.2d 310 (W.Va. 1997).
144

145

352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).

148

383 S.E.2d 786 (w.Va. 1989).

147

456 S.E.2d 194 (W.Va. 1995).

148

500 S.E.2d 3 10 (W.Va. 1997).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

the insured has substantially prevailed.'
In Thomas, the plaintiffs truck was wrecked. He estimated the loss at $10,231.05.
State Farm offered $4,960.72.' The jury awarded the insured $13,213."'1
Obviously, a jury verdict for the plaintiff for an amount more than he requested
satisfies the substantially prevailed standard.
In Hadorn v. Shea,"2 the insured pursued an underinsured motorist claim
against his insurer. The insured made a demand on State Farm for $300,000. State
Farm responded by offering the insured $15,000. The insured rejected this
settlement offer. In response, State Farm increased its offer to $22,500. The insured
rejected that offer and demanded $300,000 during the entire negotiation period.
After the case was tried, the jury awarded the insured $90,000.
The insured did not substantially prevail. The plaintiffs last settlement
demand of $300,000 before filing suit was compared to the jury verdict of $90,000.
State Farm offered $22,500, which is closer to the amount awarded by the jury than
to the amount that the plaintiff demanded. The jury award was $210,000 less than
the amount the plaintiff requested before trial, and $67,500 more than State Farm's
offer. These three figures indicate that the plaintiff did not substantially prevail.
This looks like math: who is closer to the jury verdict? Nonetheless, the court
warned that it "[did] not advocate such a purely mechanical approach to deciding
the question of whether a plaintiff 'substantially prevails." 3
The court in Hadorn also considered other factors in determining whether
the plaintiff substantially prevailed. First, it determined that it did not appear that
the plaintiff was interested in settlement for any amount less than her original
demand of $300,000.' The plaintiff did not negotiate in that she did not waiver
from her original demand. Second, the court found that the plaintiff did not prove
"but for" her attorney's services she would not have been able to get State Farm to
settle for $90,000 without proceeding to trial. Thus, instead of using a mechanical
approach to determine whether the insured substantially prevailed, the court in
Hadorn "considered the status of the claim at the time negotiations broke down,
which included consideration of the insured's interest in attempting settlement
before trial."

's

149

383 S.E.2d at 790-91.

150

Id. at 79 1.

11

Id. at 788.

152

456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995).

153

Id. at 197.

154

Id. at 198.

155

Id
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1 " has enunciated a much more
The most recent case, Miller v. Fluharty,
flexible test to determine whether the plaintiff has substantially prevailed. Miller
stated that "whether a policyholder has substantially prevailed is determined by
looking at the totality of the policyholder's negotiations with the insurance carrier,
1 57
not merely the status of negotiations before and after a lawsuit is filed."
According to this case, negotiations must be looked at as a whole, including
whether the policyholder's demand is reasonable and whether the insurer promptly
responded.'58

2.

When does substantially prevail apply?

Is an insured still entitled to attorney's fees if he substantially prevails even
though he settles before going to trial? In Jordanv. Nat. Grange Mutual Ins. Co.,l '
the court determined that an insured
"substantially" prevails in a property damage action against his or
her insurer when the action is settled for an amount equal to or
approximating the amount claimed by the insured immediately
prior to the commencement of the action, as well as when the
action is concluded by ajury verdict for such an amount. 6
In Jordan,the insured plaintiff filed a civil action against the insurer and
then settled for $40,000. The settlement was silent as to an amount of attorney's
fees. The plaintiffs did not cash the settlement check because they believed that the
insurer should pay for their reasonable attorney's fees. The insurer sought
enforcement of the settlement agreement and objected to payment of the attorney's
fees.
The Court held that a settlement can be analogized to a judgment with
respect to the award of reasonable attorney's fees. It reasoned that "it is
incongruous to require [a] plaintiff to bypass a settlement offer and proceed to trial
in order to 'earn' counsel fees, especially when a settlement and trial would have
substantially achieved the same result.""" However, in settlement situations, the
plaintiff must meet an extra requirement, that "the attorney's services were

156

500 S.E.2d 310 (W.Va. 1997).

157

Id. at 321.

158

Id.

159

393 S.E.2d 647 (W.Va. 1990).
Id. at 652. (quoting Van Houten v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co. 387 A.2d 419, 421 (N.J.
Passaic County Dist. Ct. 1978), aff'd406 A.2d 984 (N.J. App Div. 1979)).
181
Id. at 651.
160
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'
necessary to obtain payment of the insurance proceeds."162
In determining the
necessity of the attorney's services, "the insured must show that but for his or her
163
attorney's services such settlement would not have been reached ... ,"
The substantially prevailed standard was also extended to appraisal
proceedings in Smithson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co..' In Smithson,
the plaintiffs obtained an insurance policy with a $60,000 limit on their truck. The
truck was destroyed in an explosion, and the insured submitted a proof of loss for
the value of the truck to the insurance company. The two parties could not agree on
the actual cash value of the truck, so the insurance company invoked the appraisal
procedure provided for in the policy. The loss was appraised at $67,000, which
exceeded the policy limits. The insured then sued the insurance company because
he had substantially prevailed. The plaintiff proved a loss in excess of policy limits
of $60,000, whereas the insurer offered $25,000. The court found that "a first-party
suit based on Hayseeds will not be barred by the settlement of the loss in an
appraisal proceeding under the fire insurance policy if the insured substantially
prevailed in the appraisal proceeding over the amount of the loss."' 65 Thus,
Smithson extended substantially prevailed to appraisal proceedings. Plaintiffs can
substantially prevail by either verdict (as in Hayseeds and Thomas); by settlement
(as in Jordan);or by appraisal (as in Smithson).
Until Marshall v. Saseen'" was decided in 1994, the substantially
prevailed standard only applied to property insurance. The Marshallcase involved
an underinsured motorist claim. The Court extended the substantially prevailed test
to all first party insurance claims by stating that "[a]lthough we recognize that
Hayseeds and its progeny involved insurance policies covering property damage
claims, we can see no reason why these principles should not apply to uninsured
and underinsured motorist coverage."'6 7 It extended the Hayseeds substantially
prevailed test to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage because these types
of coverage, just like property damage coverage, constituted first party insurance. It
determined that the reasoning behind the substantially prevailed standard applied to
all types of first party insurance.

3.

What types of damages are recoverable?

After an insured proves that he has substantially prevailed, he is entitled to
a whole array of consequential and compensatory damages. These damages include
162

Id. at 652.

163

Id.

164

411 S.E2d 850 (W. Va. 1991).

165

Id. at 858.

164

450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1994).

167

Id. at 797.
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attorney's fees, net economic loss, and aggravation and inconvenience (emotional
distress, anger, anguish, chagrin, depression, disappointment, embarrassment, fear,
fright, grief, horror, humiliation, shame, and worry).,8
First, the insured is entitled to recover attorney's fees. There are two ways
to determine attorney's fees. The first method, described in Hayseeds, stated that
"[p]resumptively, reasonable attorneys' fees.., are one-third of the face amount of
the policy, unless the policy is either extremely small or enormously large.""1 ' The
court then went on to explain that "when a claim is for under $20,000 or for over
$1,000,000 (to take numbers that are applicable in 1986)70 the court should then
inquire concerning what 'reasonable attorneys' fees' are." 1
The second method is the twelve-factor Pitrolotest:
Where attorney's fees are sought against a third party, the test of
what should be considered a reasonable fee is determined not
solely by the fee arrangement between the attorney and his client.
The reasonableness of attorney's fees is generally based on
broader factors such as: (1) the time and labor required: (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8). the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of
the case; (11) the nature and length and the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases."'
Landmark Baptist Church172 is the key case applying the Pitrolo test. The argument
was that the plaintiff had not sufficiently proven the amount of attorney's fees. The
plaintiff submitted per hour fee arrangement documentation; detailed monthly
statements showing time, services rendered, charges for services, and expenses
advanced; and an affidavit from the pastor of the insured church indicating his
belief that the fees were reasonable. The court found that the information submitted
by the plaintiff was enough to determine if the fees were reasonable using the
twelve factors. "3 It also stated that the trial court had wide discretion in determining
168

Hayseeds,352 S.E.2d at 80.

1fi9

Id.

170

.Id.

171

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156, 157 Syl. Pt. 4 (W.Va. 1986).

172

484 S.E.2d 195 (W.Va. 1997).

173

Id. at 198.
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the reasonableness of the fees because it had first-hand knowledge of the case and
the legal work involved."
Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover for net economic loss. "' These
damages "must be proved with reasonable certainty."' 78 In Smithson, the plaintiff's
only evidence to support his economic loss was his testimony of an estimate of lost
profits.'77 He did not prove this loss by any detailed evidence from the partnership
accounts or tax returns. The court found that "loss of profits cannot be based on
estimates which amount to mere speculation and conjecture but must be proved
with reasonable certainty.""'7 Therefore, it determined that the plaintiffs evidence
was insufficient to prove any net economic loss.
Finally, if they substantially prevail, insureds are entitled to recover
damages for aggravation and inconvenience."' These damages represent those that
would be recoverable for emotional distress. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the term emotional distress "passes under various names, such as mental suffering,
mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly
unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea."' 80 In Mutafis v.
Erie Ins. Exchange,'' the insured plaintiff recovered damages for aggravation and
inconvenience by giving testimony that she suffered "anguish, embarrassment,
shame, anger, and depression" as a result of her insurer's conduct."
Why has West Virginia established this substantially prevailed standard?
West Virginia "adopted this rule in recognition of the fact that, when an insured
purchases a contract of insurance, he buys insurance - not a lot of vexatious, time
consuming, expensive litigation with his insurer." ' 83 The court believed that an
insurer has a contractual obligation to its insured, and when it violates that
obligation, the insured should be compensated for his expenses incurred as a result
of the violation, including attorney's fees and expenses arising from litigation.'4
174

Id. at 199.

175

Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80.

176

Smithson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 411 S.E.2d 850, 861 (W.Va. 1991) (quoting

Kentucky Fried Chicken of Morgantown v. Sellaro, 214 S.E.2d 823 (W. Va. 1975)).
177

Id. at 861.

178

Id. at 862 (quoting State ex ret. Shatzer v. Freeport Coal Co. 107 S.E.2d 503, 505 Syl. Pt. 5 (W.

Va. 1959).
179

Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80.

180

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(j).

181

328 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1985).

182

Id. at 690.

183

Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79.

184

Id.
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The substantially prevailed standard applies only in West Virginia, only to
first party claims, and only to common law Hayseeds actions. 88 In addition, West
Virginia is the only state not to require wrongful conduct on the part of the
insurance company in a cause of action for insurance company claim misconduct. 88
This standard results in a form of strict liability for insurance companies. When an
insurance company engages in misconduct in West Virginia, it is essentially acting
at its peril, or to paraphrase Stephen Ashley, if an insurer in West Virginia decided
to deny or lowball a claim, it had better be right. If it is wrong, it pays. 8
C.

The InsurerMust Have Acted In BadFaith

Bad faith plays no part in this cause of action. The standard is substantially
prevails. The court in Hayseeds "consider[ed] of little importance whether an
insurer contests an insured's claim in good faith or bad faith. In either case the
insured is out his consequential damages and attorney's fees."' 88 It then explained
that bad faith short of actual malice no longer belonged in property damage
insurance cases."' Therefore, West Virginia is a strict liability state with regard to
insurance company claim misconduct.
However, bad faith is one of the sequential steps in Marshall."g Bad faith
is included because it allows an insured plaintiff to recover excess over policy
proceeds. 1 ' The court's position is that substantially prevailed is not enough to
obtain the excess.' Therefore, bad faith is necessary to recover the excess over
policy proceeds.
Marshall involved a claim for underinsured proceeds. The plaintiff
demanded policy limits of $100,000, but the insurer declined and instead offered
$10,000.2" At trial the jury awarded the plaintiff $176,711.80.1"4 The plaintiff
substantially prevailed and was entitled to collect the $100,000 policy proceeds and
all consequential and compensatory damages. The plaintiff wanted the $76,711.80
in excess over the policy proceeds. The court held that the plaintiff must prove bad
185

Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791,797 (W. Va. 1994).

188

See Henderson, supranote 37, at 1155.

187

Miller v. Fluharty, 500 S.E.2d 310, 321 (W. Va. 1997) (citing STEPHEN S.ASHLEY, BAD FAITH

ACTIONS § 5:08 (1984)).
188
Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79.
189

Id.at 81.

190

450 S.E.2d 791 (NV.Va. 1994).

191

Id. at 798.

192

Id.

183

Id.at 794.

194

Id.
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faith in order to recover this excess. " 5
Bad faith by a first party insurer is unreasonable conduct.'" Once a
plaintiff proves this, he has proved prima facie bad faith. The burden then shifts to
the insurance company to prove good faith. 97 In Marshall,"8 the Shamblin", test
was used. This test, which is used to determine whether an insurer is liable for the
excess over the policy limits, asks "whether the reasonably prudent insurer would
have refused to settle within policy limits under the facts and circumstances,
bearing in mind always its duty of good faith and fair dealing with the insured." 2
To determine whether the insurer's efforts to settle are reasonable, the trial court
should consider the following:
Whether there was appropriate investigation and evaluation of the
claim based upon objective and cogent evidence; whether the
insurer had a reasonable basis to conclude that there was a genuine
and substantial issue as to liability of its insured; and whether
there was potential for substantial recovery of an excess verdict
against its insured. Not one of these factors may be considered to
the exclusion of the others."'
The court also stated that this issue was to be determined in another suit
where the burden was on the insurer to prove that it attempted in good faith to
negotiate a settlement.202 Therefore, Marshall extended the Shamblin test of bad
faith to all first party insurance cases.
Do not confuse excess over policy proceeds damages with compensatory
damages recoverable when an insured substantially prevails. Excess over policy
proceeds represents the amount awarded by the jury above the amount of the
insured's policy limit. For example, in Marshall the judgment awarded against the
insurance company was $176,711.80.203 The insured's policy limit was $100,000;
therefore, the $76,711.80 represented the excess. Bad faith in first party insurance
2
requires the insurer to pay all damages in excess of policy proceeds.'
195

Marshall,450 S.E.2d at 798.

16

Id.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1990).
Id. at 768 Syl. Pt. 4.

200
201

Marshall,450 S.E.2d at 798; Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 768 Syl. Pt. 4.

202

Marshall,450 S.E.2d at 798.

203

Id. at 794.

204

Id. at 798.
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The InsurerMust Have Acted With Actual Malice

The last sequential step in a prima facie cause of action is actual malice.
Actual malice unlocks Pandora's box of punitive damages. Actual malice occurs
when "the company actually knew that the policyholder's claim was proper, but
willfully, maliciously, and intentionally denied the claim."2 5 This standard is high
to prevent the award of punitive damages." Because the court has lowered the
standard of liability, it has raised the bar to recover punitive damages 7 The trial
court should allow the jury to decide upon compensatory damages to be decided
upon by the jury, but not upon punitive damages.
Actual malice is not negligence, lack of judgment, incompetence, or
bureaucratic confusion. 8 "An offer of settlement can never be used to show
'actual malice' nor be used against an insurance carrier in any way."" An example
of actual malice would be a "company-wide policy of delaying the payment of just
claims through barraging the policyholder with mindless paperwork."210
In all of the eighteen first party common law insurance misconduct cases,
no insurance company has been found guilty of actual malice.' This illustrates the
policy of a trade-off that allows plaintiffs to recover damages under the low
threshhold substantially prevails standard, but not punitive damages under the
actual malice standard.
Punitive damages also involve due process problems. The United States
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a grossly excessive punishment on a
tortfeasor. ' The West Virginia Supreme Court mandated a review of a punitive
damage award to determine if the award is excessive 3" A distinction is made
between those defendants who did not intentionally or malevolently harm a
plaintiff and those defendants who intentionally or malevolently committed acts
they knew to be harmful." Where the defendant has acted with extreme negligence

Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80-81.

205

In the opinion of the author this would be a perfect jury

instruction on actual malice.
206
Id. atSl.
207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Hayseeds,352 S.E.2d. at 81 n.2.

211

For a list of the eighteen cases, see supra Part IV.A-R.

212

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).

213

Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 900 Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1991).

214

*

TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 874 Syl. Pt. 15 (W. Va.

1992).
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or wanton disregard but with no actual intention to cause harm, and where the
compensatory damages are neither negligible nor very large, the limit of the ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages is about five to one." ' When the
defendant acts with the "actual evil intention, much higher ratios are not per se
unconstitutional." ' As of this writing, the case concerning these due process
controls is Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc.217 By adopting the above tests, this case
stated that the objective of punitive damages awards "is the goal of ensuring that
such awards will serve to deter similar conduct."2 '8
VI. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS / THE FUTURE

A.

BrightLine Tests for SubstantiallyPrevailed

One of the questions that still remains is how to prove whether the insured
substantially prevailed. It is simple to determine that an insured substantially
prevailed when the jury verdict is equal to or close to what the insured demanded.
However, it is difficult to determine whether the insured substantially prevailed
when the jury verdict is much less than what the insured demanded, but also much
more than what was offered by the insurer. A bright line test would easily allow all
to determine whether an insured substantially prevailed. Two examples of bright
line tests are shown below. The first test, suggested by Richard Costella, would
provide that
[a]n insured "substantially prevails" in a property damage action
against his or her insurer when the action is settled for an amount
equal to or in approximating the amount claimed by the insured
immediately prior to the commencement of the action, as well as
when the action is concluded by a jury verdict for such an
amount." 9
This test involves adding the last demand by the insured and the last offer
by the insurer, dividing by two, and then comparing that figure to the amount of the
jury verdict. If the jury verdict is more than the computed figure, then the insured
substantially prevailed, and if the jury verdict is less than the computed figure, then
the insured did not substantially prevail. This test is "simple and concise" and will

"promote efficiency, predictability, and uniformity in the determination of whether
215

Id.

218

Id. at 874 Syl. Pt. 15.

217

490 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam).

218

Id. at 691.

219

Richard Costella, Note, SubstantiallyPrevailedDamages: Fee Shifting in West Virginia Insurance

at 888.

Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 811, 826 (1997).
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an insured substantially prevailed in an action against his or her insurer.""
The second test of determining substantially prevailed is to compare what
the insured demanded and what the insurer offered to the jury verdict. If the jury
verdict is more than what the insurer offered, then the insured substantially
prevailed by the percentage of the jury verdict to the insured's demand. For
example, assume that the insured demanded $100,000, the insurer offered $50,000,
and the jury awarded $70,000. The jury verdict is more than the insurer's offer, so
the insured substantially prevails. The insured's consequential damages are the
percentage of the jury verdict to the insured's demand, which is $70,000/$ 100,000
or 70%.
B.

To What Kinds of Insurance Will Hayseeds Attach?

Another question that still remains is to what other kinds of insurance will
Hayseeds apply. The courts have already applied the substantially prevailed
standard to fire,"

life,'

uninsured motorist,2

underinsured motorist,'

and

collision insurance.' Hayseeds should not apply to all first party insurance
company misconduct claims. All insurance is purchased for the same reason:
protection.
C.

Defenses

An area of insurance law that has not yet been mentioned js defenses.
Insurance companies in West Virginia are subject to the risk of damages more than
in any other state. Therefore, insurance companies need to be aware of the
different types of defenses to protect themselves from liability for insurance
company claim misconduct. One defense available to insurance companies is the
statute of limitations. Although insurance company claim misconduct is generally
treated as a tort, the general rule is, where a case sounds both in contract and tort
the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort and
220

Id.

221

Firstbank Shinnston v. West Virginia Ins. Co., 408 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1991); Smithston v. United

States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 411 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1991); Jordan v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 393
S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1990); Hayseeds Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
D'annunzio v. Security Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 410 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1991).
Burgess v. Porterfield, 469 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va 1996); State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
v. Canady, 475 S.E.2d 107 (W. Va. 1996); \Veese v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115 (4"' Cir 1989).
Z23

224

Hadom v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995); Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va.

1994); Arnot v. Burdette, 434 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1993).
M
226

Thomas v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989).
Insurance companies are subject to the risk of damages in West Virginia more than in any other

state because of West Virginia's unique rule of substantially prevails.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

one of contract.227 Of course, in West Virginia the plaintiff will want the court to
adopt the contract statute of limitations, which is 10 years under W. Va. Code
section 55-2-6. However, the defendant can argue that the tort statute of limitations
of two years should apply to insurance company claim misconduct cases. The
majority rule throughout the country is to apply the contract statute of limitations. "8
Comparative bad faith is another possible defense. This defense is raised to
an action brought by the insured alleging insurance company claim misconduct to
"reduce or negate claimed extra-contractual damages."229 When the insurer pleads
the comparative bad faith defense, the conduct of the insured is analyzed according
to the comparative fault principles used in negligence cases. 3 ° When raising this
defense, the insurance company should raise it as an affirmative defense to avoid
having it waived.2"1
In contrast to comparative bad faith is the defense of reverse bad faith.
Reverse bad faith is an affirmative claim / cause of action by an insurer against its
insured for losses sustained by the insurer as a result of the insured's conduct.
Examples of these types of losses include "payment made to an innocent coinsured; payment made to a mortgagee for loss occasioned by an insured's fraud
such as arson; investigation costs incurred that revealed the insured's fraud; and
lost subrogation rights."232
Another defense available to insurance companies is the "advice of
counsel" defense. The advice of counsel defense is raised to prove that the insurer
did not commit insurance company claim misconduct because it relied on its advice
of counsel to make its decisions. 32 This defense can also be offered to mitigate
claimed punitive damages.2u The "advice of counsel" defense has four
requirements: "(1) The insurer disclosed to the attorney all information necessary
to make the coverage determination; (2) The attorney was acting as the insurer's
attorney in providing the advice; (3) The insurer relied on counsel's advice in good
faith; [and] (4) The insurer did, in fact, act on the advice.""23 In this defense, the
attorney-client privilege is waived as to communications and documents relating to
the advice. Therefore, when deciding to use this defense, the insurer must consider
whether the benefits of the defense outweigh the protection afforded by the
227

Eads v. Marks, 249 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1952) (en banc).

228

WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION

229

Id. at§ 30.03[2].

230

Id.

231

Id.

232

Id.

233

SHERNOFF,

234

Id

235

Id.

§ 20.07 [3] [B] (1998).

supra note 228, at § 30.04[2].
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attorney-client privilege.'
D.

Preemptionby ERISA

Another issue that remains is preemption of first party insurance company
claim misconduct actions. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) is a federal statute designed to regulate employee benefit plans including
group insurance plans." ERISA preempts state common-law tort and contract
actions asserting an insurer's improper processing of an employee's claim for
disability benefits for an employment-related injury under an insured employee
benefit plan. However, before the ERISA preemption becomes an issue, it must
first be determined whether the insurance policy is an ERISA plan:
An insurance policy is part of an ERISA plan if it is a plan, fund, or
program established or maintained by an employer of an employee organization, or
both, for the purpose of providing medical, surgical, hospital care, sickness,
accident, disability, death, unemployment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, day-care centers, scholarship funds, prepaid legal services
or severance benefits to participants or their beneficiaries. 9
If it is determined that the insurance policy is an ERISA plan, then under
ERISA's preemption clause, if a state law relates to employee benefits plans, it is
preempted.240 However, under ERISA's "insurance saving clause," laws that
regulate insurance are saved from preemption."' The United States Supreme Court
held that an employee's insurance company claim misconduct suit against a longterm disability insurer was preempted by ERISA's preemption clause and was not
saved by the statute's saving clause. 2 The Court reasoned that even though the
Mississippi law of insurance company claim misconduct deals with the insurance
industry, the law developed from general principles of tort and contract law and
was therefore not considered a law the "regulates insurance" within the meaning of
ERISA's saving clause." 3
The West Virginia Supreme Court in Ball v. Life PlanningServices, Inc.2'

238

Id.

237

Id. at § 5.07[2] [a].

238

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (allowing for preemption of any and all state laws ihsofar as they

relate to any employee benefit plan).
239

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).

240

Id

241

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).

242

Id.

243

Id. at 49-50.

244

421 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 1992).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 101:I

was asked to determine whether W. Va. Code sections 33-12-21 and 33-11-4(9)
were preempted by ERISA.1 5 The court found that W. Va. Code section 33-12-21,
which imposes personal liability upon "any agent or broker who participates
directly or indirectly in effecting any insurance contract, except authorized
reinsurance, upon any subject of insurance resident, located or to be performed in
this State, where the insurer is not licensed to transact insurance in this State," has
only a tenuous effect on employee welfare benefit plans and does not "relate to"
employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA 6 Thus, actions
brought against agents or brokers under this statute are not preempted by ERISA.
However, the court found that ERISA did preempt W. Va. Code section 33-11-4(9)
because this statute is the unfair claim settlement practices statute that is the same
type of statute that the Supreme
Court determined was preempted in Pilot Life
247
Dedeaux.
v.
Co.
Insurance
PART II: FIRST PARTY STATUTORY INSURANCE MISCONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION

West Virginia law of statutory misconduct is broad. In fact, West Virginia
is one of only eight jurisdictions that allow a private cause of action for violation of
the Unfair Trade Practices Act.2 8 The Act provides a comprehensive list of
prohibited practices by insurance companies. If an insurance company violates the
Act, a plaintiff may bring a private cause of action for such violation. There are a
plethora of damages available. If an insurance company committed violations with
actual malice, then punitive damages are awarded. Unfortunately, the law of
statutory misconduct in West Virginia is confusing. This section will explain
statutory misconduct law, thus providing a cohesive guide for practitioners, judges,
and insurers.
II. HISTORY
A.

National

The history of statutory insurance bad faith begins in 1944 when the U.S.
249
Supreme Court decided in United States v. Southeastern UnderwritersAss "n.
that
the insurance business was part of interstate commerce and therefore subject to
245

Id. at 223.

248

Id. at 224.

247

Id. at 227.

248

W. VA. CODE§

249

322 U.S. 533 (1944).

33-11-4 (1996).
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federal laws."5 Within a year of that decision, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act, 1 which placed the regulation of insurance primarily with the states.
All but six states have adopted some form of the Unfair Trade Practices Act to
regulate insurance. 2 Forty-five states have adopted regulations based on Model
Acts promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC).
B.

3

West Virginia

West Virginia adopted its version of the NAIC Model Act in 1957.21 In
1981, the West Virginia Supreme Court in Jenkins v. JC. Penney Casualty
Insurance Co."5 allowed a private cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices section" of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices
Act. 7 Jenkins involved a third party plaintiff, but the Court later expanded the
cause of action to first party plaintiffs in Thompson v. W. Va. EssentialProperty
Insurance Co."' In addition to providing a private cause of action under the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices provisions, the Court has allowed private causes of
action under other parts of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. In Morton v. Amos-Lee
259
a private cause of action was allowed for misrepresentation and false
Securities,
1
advertising of insurance policies." ° In Mutafis v. Erie Insurance Exchange," a
2
private cause of action was allowed under the "Defamation" section and the

250

Id. at 551-62.

251

See 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15 (1994).

252

SHERNOFF, supranote 228, at § 6.03[2].

253

Id.

See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1996). Although technically the West Virginia Unfair Trade
Practices Act includes sections other than "33-11-4," for purposes of this section, and for practical purposes,
we shall refer to the Act as "33-11 -4" only as the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act.
280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on othergrounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas.
255
25

Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (,V. Va.1994).
256

W. VA. CODE

§ 33-11-4(9) (1996).

27

.W. VA. CODE

§ 33-11 -4 (1996).

411 S.E.2d 27, 34-35 (W,.
Va.1991), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire
& Cas, Co. v. Madden 452 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1994) as explained in Light v. Allstate Ins. Co. No. 24365
(WV.Va.July 7, 1998).
466 S.E.2d 542, 547 (W.Va.1995).
259
25

§ 33-11-4(1) (1996).

260

W. VA. CODE

261

328 S.E.2d 675 (W.Va. 1985).

262

W. VA. CODE

§ 33-11-4(3)

(1996).
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"False statements and entries" section.263 To date, most litigation has been based on
the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act." Presumably, a private cause of action
would be allowed under any section of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
III. NATIONAL NORM

Most states that have adopted an act allow only an administrative
remedy. 6 Eight states, however, allow a private cause of action against insurers.
Florida has a statute that provides for a private cause of action to be brought under
its act.2" Texas," 7 Massachusetts, 8 and Louisiana6 9 have similar statutes. Other
states have private causes of action that have been judicially imposed, including
Kentucky,27 Montana, 1 North Dakota,272 and West Virginia.7 Although California
was the first state to allow a private cause of action under its common law in Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,274 that decision was overruled nine years
later in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman'sFund Insurance Co.2"5 The Arizona Supreme
Court once allowed a cause of action, but that case was superceded by statute.7
IV. WEST VIRGINIA LAW- OVERVIEW

West Virginia law provides both statutory law.7 and administrative

263

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(5) (1996).

264

W. VA. CODE

265

SHERNOFF,

266

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155 (1996).

267

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21 (West 1996).

268

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (1994).

269

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 33-11-4(9) (1996).

supra note 228, at § 6.03 [3].

§ 22:1220 (1995).

See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1989).
271
See Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1983), modified by statute as explained in O'Fallon v.
Farmer's Ins. Exchange 859 P.2d 1008 (Mont. 1993).
270

272

See Farmer's Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co, 626 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1985).

273
See Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on other
grounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden 451 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1994).
274

592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).

275

758 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1988).

276

ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 20-461 (1997).

277

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1996) is the Unfair Trade Practices Act in West Virginia. W. VA. CODE

§ 33-11-4(9) is the section prohibiting unfair claims settlement practices.
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regulations278 to prevent statutory insurance misconduct. Although the
administrative regulations provide only an administrative relief, the court has
provided for a private cause of action for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices
Act
4.

9

Statutes

West Virginia passed its Unfair Trade Practices Act in 195728 The Act has
several sections. Section 33-11-4, entitled "Unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices defined," establishes the statutory definitions
of unfair trade practices. 1 The violation and interpretation of this section are the
subject of most statutory misconduct litigation. The Act is referred to as being only
section 4, even though that is technically not the case.282 The Act does not expressly
provide for a private cause of action.283 The court, however, has construed the Act
to provide a private cause of action. " We examine each of the subsections of the

Act in turn.
1.

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(1)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(1) involves "[m]isrepresentation and
' Morton v. Amos-Lee Securities'- is the
false advertising of insurance policies."285
278

W. VA. CODE STATER. til14 §114-14(1-9) (1987).

279
280

Morton v. Amos-Lee Securities, 466 S.E.2d 542, 547 (W. Va. 1995).
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1996).

281

Id.

282

The West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act is actually sections 33-11-1 through 9. However,

because section 4 is the only section that is significant to litigation, we refer to it as the Act and subsequently
break it down into its various subsections.
283

W. VA. CODE§ 33-11-4 et. seq. (1996).

284

Morton, 466 S.E.2d at 547.

285

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(1) (1996). This statute states as follows:
(1) Misrepresentation and false advertising of insurance policies. No person shall
make, issue, circulate, or cause to be made, issued or circulated, any estimate, circular,
statement, sales presentation, omission or comparison which:
(a) Misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions or terms of any insurance policy;
or
(b) Misrepresents the dividends or share of the surplus to be received on any insurance
policy; or
(c) Make any false or misleading statements as to the dividends or share of surplus
previously paid on any insurance policy; or
(d) Is misleading or is a misrepresentation as to the financial condition of any person, or
as to the legal reserve system upon which any life insurer operates; or
(e) Uses any name or title of any insurance policy or class of insurance policies
misrepresenting the true nature thereof; or
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only case that the court heard involving this subsection. In that case, the insured'
He
deceased was a clothing salesman who was an "unsophisticated investor."287
inherited some money and sought investment counseling and advice from Richard
Keagy, an employee of the defendant, Amos-Lee Securities, Inc.288 The insured was
eventually enrolled in a detoxification program for alcohol addiction.88 Mr. Keagy
recommended that the insured purchase a single-premium whole life insurance
policy through Equitable. 8 ' The insured was found to be ineligible to purchase the
policy because of his alcoholism.29' Mr. Keagy then suggested that the insured take
out a single-premium whole life insurance policy on the life of a relative, and
suggested the insured's niece. 2 The insured rejected this idea, so Mr. Keagy and
Mr. Funderburk, Equitable's agency manager in West Virginia, suggested that the
insured purchase a life annuity instead. 3 At the time of that suggestion, Mr.
Funderburk had actual knowledge that the insured had been rejected for life
insurance because of his alcoholism.2 ' The insured died about a year later.8 ' The
plaintiff, the insured's executor, brought suit alleging misrepresentation and fraud,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of West Virginia
Code section 33-1 1-4(1)(a), because the defendants knew that the insured's health
was too poor to make a life annuity a good investment." The court, as a matter of
first impression, held that "there is a private cause of action for a violation of W.
Va. Code 33-11-4(1)(a), of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act."2 7
2.

West Virginia Code Section 33-1 1-4(2)

West Virginia Code section 33-1 1-4(2) involves "[ffalse information and
(f) Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce the lapse,
forfeiture, exchange, conversion or surrender of any insurance policy; or
(g) Is a misrepresentation for the purpose of effecting a pledge or assignment of or
effecting a loan against any insurance policy; or
(h) Misrepresents any insurance policy as being shares of stock.
286

466 S.E.2d 542 (W. Va. 1995).

287

Id. at 543.

288

Id.

289

Id.

290

Id. at 544.

291

Morton, 466 S.E.2d at 544.

292

Id.

293

Id.

294

Id. at 545.

295

Id.

296

Morton, 466. S.E.2d at 546.

297

Id at 547.
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advertising generally.""29 The statute prohibits untrue, deceptive, or misleading
publications.299 There are no cases involving this subsection yet. The court,
however, will likely extend a private cause of action to this subsection, because it
has extended private causes of action to the other subsections involving
misrepresentation and false advertising of insurance policies and defamation.
3.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(3)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(3) involves "[d]efamation." 3" This
section prevents defamatory statements against a person's financial condition." '
Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exchange is the only case involving violation of this statute. 02
In this case, the plaintiff, Ms. Mutafis, had reported the theft of her car to the
defendant, Erie Insurance Exchange.) 3 The defendant timely paid her claim."'
Three weeks later, the plaintiff's cousin reported the theft of his vehicle to the
defendant." His claim was delayed because the defendant was "investigating [his]
involvement.'' He sued the insurance company and found that the following
memo had been placed in both his and the plaintiffs file: "Please reference for
your information to file #W017415, this is a relative and associated with mafia very

299

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(2) (1996) provides that
[n]o person shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate or place before the public, or
cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed
before the public, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of a
notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster or over any radio or television station, or in
any other way, an advertisement, announcement or statement containing any assertion,
representation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with respect to
any person in the conduct of his insurance business which is untrue, deceptive or
misleading.

Id.
299
300

Id.
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(3) (1996). The statute provides that
[n]o person shall make, publish, disseminate or circulate, directly or indirectly, or aid,
abet or encourage the making, publishing, disseminating or circulating of any oral or
written statement or any pamphlet, circular, article or literature which is false, or
maliciously critical of or derogatory to the financial condition of any person and which
is calculated to injure such person

Id
301

Id.

Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 328 S.E.2d 675 (V. Va. 1985). The suit was being tried in Federal
Court, this cite is to rulings by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on a series of questions
certified to it by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
302

303

Id. at 677.

304

Id.

305

Id.

306

Id.
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heavily although may have NO connection whatever.""'
Ms. Mutafis sued the insurance company for violating West Virginia Code
sections 33-11-4(3), 33-11-4(5), the prohibitions on defamation and false
statements and entries in the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act." 8 The court
found that "West Virginia law permits a private cause of action for violation of
[section] 33-11-4(3,5)," ' and that West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(3)
"prohibits dissemination of false statements maliciously critical of or derogatory to
a person's financial condition that are calculated to injure such person." 1 ' The
court then ruled that "[c]ertainly it is maliciously critical of and derogatory to a
person's financial condition to assert that she is closely associated with the
mafia." " ' But the court added the caveat that "[i]n an action under either [of these
provisions], there is a defense of qualified privilege completely coextensive with
the defense of qualified privilege that existed heretofore in actions for defamation
' Thus,
at common law."312
"when a person publishes a statement in good faith about
a subject in which he has an interest or duty and limits the publication of the
statement to persons who have a legitimate interest in the subject matter, the
writing or speech is privileged." '13 In this case, the court found that "[t]here is, of
course, no privilege known to the common law of defamation protecting the
intentional publication of false material." 314
4.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(4)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(4) is entitled "[b]oycott, coercion and
intimidation." ' The statute is designed to prevent unreasonable restraint of or
monopoly in the business of insurance.1 The Court has not heard any cases
involving violation of this subsection. It is difficult to imagine a private cause of
307

Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 677.

308

Id. at 678. West Virginia Code section 33-11-3 prohibits defamation regarding the financial

condition of any person that is calculated to injure that person. West Virginia Code section 33-11-5 prohibits
knowingly filing, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or delivering any false material statement of fact as
to the financial condition of a person.
309
Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 677 Syl. Pt. 5.
310

Id. at Syl. Pt. I.

311

Id. at 679-80.

312

Id. at 677 Syl. Pt. 3.

313

Id. at 680.

314

Mutafis, 328 S.E.2d at 681.

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(4) (1996). This subsection provides that "[n]o person shall enter into
any agreement to commit, or by any concerted action commit, any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation
resulting in or tending to result in unreasonable restraint of,or monopoly in, the business of insurance."
315

316

Id.
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action by an insured based on this subsection.
5.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(5)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(5) is the prohibition against "[flalse
' In Mutafis v. Erie Insurance Exchange, " ' the Court
statements and entries."317
found that "West Virginia Law permits a private cause of action for violation of W.
Va. Code sections 33-11-4(3) and (5)."' 19 The Court also found that "W. Va. Code

33-11-4(5) prohibits the intentional inclusion in a private office file of any false
material statement of fact as to the financial condition of a person.""32 This
subsection of the statute seems to complement subsection (3), which prohibits
defamation. Subsection (5) appears to allow a cause of action where the publication
element of defamation is not present because publication took place only within a
company's private files.
6.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(6)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(6) prohibits the issuance of agency
company stock, other capital stock, benefit certificates, or shares in any corporation
promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance. 21 Presently, no cases
on record involve a suit for violation of this subsection.
7.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(7)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(7) is the statutory prohibition of

317

W. VA. CODE

§ 33-1I4(5) (1996). The subsection provides that

(a) No person shall knowingly file with any supervisory or other public official, or
knowingly make, publish, disseminate, circulate or deliver to any person, or place
before the public, or knowingly cause directly or indirectly, to be made, published,
disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person or placed before the public, any false
material statement of fact as to the financial condition of a person.
(b) No person shall knowingly make any false entry of a material fact in any book,
report or statement of any person or knowingly omit to make a true entry of any material
fact pertaining to the business of such person in any book, report or statement of such
person.
318

328 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1985). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see W. Va. Code Section

33-I 1-4(3) supra.
319

Mutafis,328 S.E.2d at 677 Syl. Pt. 5

320

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

321

W. VA. CODE §

33-11-4(6) (1996) states that

[n]o person shall issue or deliver or permit agents, officers or employees to issue or
deliver, agency company stock or other capital stock, or benefit certificates or shares in
any common-law corporation, or securities or any special or advisory board contracts or
other contracts of any kind promising returns and profits as an inducement to insurance.
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"[u]nfair discrimination"322 in the distribution of income. The court has not heard a
case involving this subsection. It is reasonable to believe, however, that a private
cause of action might be brought under this subsection.
8.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(8)

West Virginia Code section 33-1 1-4(8) prohibits the use of rebates to
induce insurance. 23 Presently, no cases on record involve a suit for violation of this
subsection.
9.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(9)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(9)" ' is West Virginia's version of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act. 2 This is the most litigated subsection in West Virginia in
terms of bad faith litigation, probably because it deals with the process of settling
claims. This subsection is covered under section V, West Virginia Cause of Action
for Violation of Unfair Claims Settlement Practices.
10.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(10)

West Virginia Code section 33-1 1-4(10)326 involves "[f]ailure to maintain
322.

323

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(7) (1996) reads as follows:
(7) Unfair discrimination. (a) No person shall make or permit any unfair discrimination
between individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life in the rates charged
for any contract of life insurance or of life annuity or in the dividends or other benefits
payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions of such contract.
(b) No person shall make or permit any unfair discrimination between individuals of the
same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium policy fees, or
rates charged for any policy or contract of accident and sickness insurance or in the
benefits payable thereunder, or in any of the terms or conditions of such contract, or in
any other manner whatever.
(c) As to kinds of insurance other than life and accident and sickness, no person shall
make or permit any unfair discrimination in favor of particular persons, or between
insureds or subjects of insurance having substantially like insuring, risk and exposure
factors or expense elements, in the terms or conditions of any insurance contract, or in
the rate or amount of premium charge therefor. This paragraph shall not apply as to any
premium or premium rate in effect pursuant to article twenty [ 33-20-1 et seq.] of this
chapter.
W. VA. CODE §33-11-4(8) (1996).

324

W. VA. CODE § 33-I1-4(9) (1996).

325

See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996).

326

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(10) (1996) states as follows:
(10) Failure to maintain complaint handling procedures. -- No insurer shall fail to
maintain a complete record of all the complaints which it has received since the date of
its last examination under section nine [§ 33-2-9], article two of this chapter. This
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complaint handling procedures." This section requires the company to keep a
record of all complaints, their classification by line of insurance, the nature of each
complaint, the disposition of the complaints, and the time to process each
complaint. 27 No cases involving this subsection have come before the court. It is
reasonable to believe, however, that a private cause of action could be brought
under this subsection.
11.

West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(11)

West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(11)"

8

prohibits the making of

fraudulent statements in applications for insurance in order to gain a fee or
commission from an insurer or broker. This section has not been before the court to
date and is clearly designed to apply mainly to insurance solicitors.
B.

Regulations

In addition to the code law, West Virginia also has a series of Unfair Trade
Practices Regulations promulgated by the State Insurance Commission. The
purpose of the regulations is to define practices "which constitute unfair methods
of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and to establish certain
minimum standards and methods of settlements of

. .

. claims.""2 9 Like most

administrative rules, these regulations have a private cause of action for violation of
these regulations."0 The penalty for violation of the regulations is determined by
the Insurance Commissioner who may
refuse to renew, or may revoke or suspend the license of [the
violator] ...

[or may], at his discretion, order such person to pay

to the State of West Virginia a penalty... [or] order such person
to discontinue such illegal, improper or unjust transaction of

record shall indicate the total number of complaints, their classification by line of
insurance, the nature of each complaint, the disposition of these complaints and the time
it took to process each complaint. For purposes of this subsection, "complaint" shall
mean any written communication primarily expressing a grievance.
327

328

329

Id.
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(11) (1996) reads as follows:

(11) Misrepresentation in insurance applications.
No person shall make false or
fraudulent statements or representations on or relative to an application for an insurance
policy, for the purpose of obtaining a fee, commission, money or other benefit from any
insurer, agent, broker or individual.
W. VA. CODE STATE. R. tit. 114 § 114-14-1(1.1(a)) (1987).

W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114 § 114-14-9 (9.1) (1987). Such a cause of action would be
unnecessary given the broad scope of the statutory Unfair Trade Settlement Practices Act, including the
Unfair Claim Settlement PracticesAct.

330
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insurance and to adjust and pay obligations as they become due.'
These administrative rules cover the following unfair or deceptive acts or
practices:
standards
for the
acknowledgment
of pertinent
communications;332 standards for prompt investigations and fair, and
equitable settlements applicable to all insurers;333 standards for prompt, fair
and equitable settlements applicable to automobile insurance;" and
separability?35

V. WEST VIRGINIA CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF UNFAIR CLAIMS

SETTLEMENT PRACTICES

The West Virginia Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act is codified as
West Virginia Code section 33-1 1-4(9)."' Because this subsection of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act is by far and away the most litigated, it deserves special
treatment. A cause of action involves four sequential steps. Each successful step
except for the second increases the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled.
Successful litigation of each sequential step will entitle the plaintiff to a greater
amount of damages. The sequential steps are as follows: (1) resolution of the policy
coverage claim, after which a successful plaintiff is entitled to collect up to the
proceeds of the policy; (2) violation of subsection (9); (3) violation of the statute by
the defendant with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, for
which the plaintiff is entitled to damages for aggravation and inconvenience,
attorney fees and costs, excess judgment over the policy limit, expenses, loss of
consortium, and net economic loss; and (4) actual malice, allowing recovery of
punitive damages. Beware of the bifurcation confusion. The sequential steps in a
statutory cause of action should not be bifurcated.3" All four steps in the cause of
action should be tried together. The confusing nature of this cause of action,
however, has led some courts to improperly bifurcate the steps.3 8

331

Id.

332

See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996); W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114 § 114-14-5(1987).

333

See W. VA. CODE §33-11-4(9) (1996); W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114

§

334

See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996); W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114

§ 114-14-7 (1987).

335

See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996); W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114 § 114-14-8 (1987).

336

W. VA. CODE

114-14-6 (1987).

§ 33-11-4(9) (1996).

See McCormick v. Allstate Insurance Co., 475 S.E.2d 507, 519 (W. Va. 1996); see also discussion
infra Part VI.A.
337

338

See generally McCormick, 475 S.E.2d at 510; see also discussion infra Part VI.C.
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SequentialStep One: UnderlyingClaim is Ultimately Resolved

The first step is a resolution of the underlying claim in favor of the insured.
This means nothing more than that the insured had a valid claim. 9 The court in
McCormick so said, referring to Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance
Company? Jenkins is the major case on third party statutory actions in West
Virginia. The court there held that before the third party plaintiff can sue the
liability insurer, the plaintiff must ultimately resolve his liability claim against the
defendant."4 The reasons for that rule are to avoid prejudice to the insurer and to
test the plaintiff's satisfaction with his tort remedy. In first party cases, the reason
for this step is to determine whether the plaintiff-insured has a valid claim. If there
is no valid claim, there is no statutory cause of action. Upon resolution of the
underlying policy claim, the plaintiff is entitled to recover up to the policy
proceeds. 2
B.

SequentialStep Two: Violation of the Statute

The second step is to show a violation of section 33-11-4(9)." There is
little jurisprudence to help determine the meaning of the substantive words in most
of the subparagraphs. For example, subparagraph (f) contains the language "[n]ot
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear." 3 The words in bold have
not been defined by the court. We suggest the following: good faith means that an
insurer did not act unreasonably by failing to compensate the insured, without
4 We suggest that "prompt"
proper cause, for a loss covered by the policy."
should
be defined by the state insurance regulations. Under the regulations, an insurer
must acknowledge the receipt of a notification of a claim or respond to other
pertinent communication within fifteen days; " the insurer also has fifteen days to
commence any investigation? 7 We suggest that "fair and equitable" should be
339

40

See McCormick, 475 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. (citing Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252,260 (W. Va. 1981)).

341

Jenkins,280 S.E.2d at 259.

342

See Thomas v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989); W. VA CODE § 56-

3-31 (1997).
343

W. VA. CODE §

34

W. VA. CODE § 33-1

35

See discussion infra note 390 and accompanying text (Part VII Questions and Answers and the

33-11-4(9) (1996).
1-4(9)(t) (1996) (emphasis added).

Future).
346

See W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114 § 114-14-5 (5.1) (1987); see also discussion infra note 390

and accompanying text (Part VII Questionsand Ansivers andthe Future).
347

See W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114 § 114-14-5 (5.2) (1987); see also discussion infra note 390
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given a marketplace-type definition. Much as a fair and equitable price for a house
is whatever a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, a fair and equitable
settlement is what a reasonable insured would accept from a reasonable insurer. 8
We suggest that liability is "reasonably clear" when "a reasonable person, with
knowledge of the relevant facts and law, would probably have concluded, for good
reason, that the insurer was liable to the plaintiff." 9
Several West Virginia cases illustrate causes of action under W. Va. Code
section 33-11-4(9). In Thompson v. W. Va. Essential Property Insurance, the

insurer violated subparagraph (e), "[flailing to affirm or deny coverage of claims
within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed,"'
because it delayed payment by improperly claiming thatl'the insured was a "prime
suspect" in the fire loss."' In Romano v. New England Mutual Life Insurance

Co.,2 the insurer violated subparagraphs (d), "[r]efusing to pay claims without
conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information;" and
(f) "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear." 3 It
improperly denied coverage under a group life insurance policy.3" In Maher v.
Continental Casualty Co. the insurer violated subparagraph (g), "[c]ompelling
insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by
offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought
by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for amounts reasonably
similar to the amounts ultimately recovered[.]" ' This sequential step is easy to
show. The insured will fit the insurer's misconduct to one of the fifteen
proscriptions in the statute.

and accompanying text (Part VII Questions and Answers and the Future).
348

See discussion infra note 390 and accompanying text (Part VII Questions and Answers and the

Future).
Demeo v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 649 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995); see
discussion infra note 390 and accompanying text (PartVII Questionsand Answers and the Future).

349

§

350

W. VA. CODE

351

See Thompson v. W. Va. Essential Property Insurance, 411 S.E.2d 27, 29 (W. Va. 1991),

33-1 1-4(9)(e) (1996).

overruledon other grounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas, Co. v. Madden 452 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va.
1994) as explained in Light v. Allstate Ins. Co. No. 24365 (W. Va. July 7, 1998).
352

362 S.E.2d 334 (W. Va. 1987).

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (d) and (f) (1996); see Romano v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
362 S.E.2d 334 (W. Va. 1987).
353

Romano, 362 S.E.2d at 335 Syl. Pt. 3 (establishing the rule that "[where an insurer provides sales
or promotional materials to an insured under a group insurance policy, which the insurer knows or should
know will be relied upon by the insured, any conflict between such materials and the master policy will be
resolved in favor of the insured.")
354

355

Maher v. Continental Casualty Co., 76 F.3d 535, 543 (41'Cir. 1996) (citing W. VA. CODE § 33-1I-

4(9)(g) (1996)).
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Sequential Step Three: Frequency as to Indicate a General Business
Practice

The third step is to show that the insurance company's violations were of
such frequency as to indicate a "general business practice."' Here, the court has
given guidance in three important cases. In Jenkins, the court held that the magic
words "frequency as to indicate a general business practice" required that the
plaintiff show that the insurer had violated the statute in several cases in the past. 7
A more recent indication of its meaning was in the case of McCormick v. Allstate
InsuranceCo. 58 There, the court said the following of general business practices:
We conceive that proof of several breaches by an insurance
company of W. Va. Code [section] 33-11-4(9), would be
sufficient to establish the indication of a general business practice.
It is possible that multiple violations of W. Va. Code [section] 3311-4(9), occurring in the same claim would be sufficient, since the
term "frequency" in the statute must relate not only to repetition
of the same violation but to the occurrence of different violations.
Proof of other violations by the same insurance company to
establish the frequency issue can be obtained from other claimants
and attorneys who have dealt with such company and its claims
agents, or from any person who is familiar with the company's
general business practice in regard to claim settlement." 9
This means that a plaintiff needs to show that the insurer violated the
statute in multiple cases in the past, or violated the statute on multiple occasions
within the plaintiff's claim. Finally, in Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., the
court held that several violations of several different sub-paragraphs, or a series of
separate and discrete violations of a single subsection will prove "general business
practice."" It therefore must be shown that either the company frequently violated
the statute in past claims, or the company violated the statute several times within a
particular claim.
At trial, the plaintiff-insured might try several methods to prove frequency.
First, the insured will testify as to facts that tend to show multiple violations of
subsection (9). Second, the plaintiff will want to examine the claims adjuster, who
will testify as to facts about the claim and possibly show violations of subsection

3

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996); see also McCormick, 475 S.E.2d at 519.

357

See Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 260.

35S

475 S.E.2d 507 (IV. Va. 1996).

3S9

McCormick, 475 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 260).

360

Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co, 491 S.E.2d'1, 10 (W. Va. 1996).
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(9). Third, the plaintiff might also call other attorneys to testify as to previous
violations of the Act in cases that they have brought against the company. In fact,
the West Virginia Trial Lawyers Association keeps a list of winning cases against
insurance companies, which future attorneys may use to locate potential attorney
witnesses. Fourth, the plaintiff may even call other claimants from these past cases,
although most plaintiffs prefer not to use them because they are unskilled
witnesses. Fifth, plaintiffs will also hire insurance experts to testify that certain
actions constitute violations of the Act. Sixth, the plaintiff might call an agent from
the office of the West Virginia State Insurance Commissioner who will have
written records of complaints filed with the office against an insurance company.
Finally, the plaintiff might call anyone else familiar with the practices of an
insurance company, for example, former agents of the company.
The plaintiff is now entitled to damages for aggravation and
inconvenience, emotional distress, anger, anguish, depression, disappointment,
embarrassment, fear, fright, grief, horror, humiliation, shame, worry, attorney's
fees and costs, 1 excess over policy proceeds, expenses, loss of consortium, and net
economic loss."2
D.

SequentialStep Four: Actual Malice

The fourth sequential step in a claim under West Virginia Code section 3311-4(9) is to show that the defendant acted with actual malice. This is a question of
fact."3 Actual malice means that "the insurance company actually knew that the
policyholder's claim was proper, but willfully, maliciously and intentionally
utilized an unfair business practice in settling, or failing to settle, the insured's
claim." 3 This is a tough standard. A plaintiff will rarely be able to prove this step,
but if the plaintiff does so prove, punitive damages will be awarded. 5
VI. OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO RECOVERY

A.

Bifurcation and The Big Trial Mess

All four sequential steps should be tried in one trial, and the trial should
not be bifurcated.' The different steps are then dealt with in the instructions to the
361

Note that attorney fees and costs must be awarded by the court through a post-trial motion and are

not awarded by the jury. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
362

Thompson, 411 S.E.2d at 35.

363

See generally McCormick,475 S.E.2d at 510 Syl. Pt. 8.

364

Id. at 509 Syl. Pt. 2.

365

Id.

See Thompson, 411 S.E.2d at 35 (holding that a cause of action under the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practice Act is premature when the underlying policy claim has not been resolved). Compare
366
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jury, who are told what they must find in order to award damages associated with
each sequential step. Juries are generally instructed as to the elements and damages
as described in this article. However, the verdict forms do not usually separate the
different sequential steps and the elements and damages that follow. Rather, the
jury is instructed as to the law, and then their award of damages on the jury verdict
form indicates that all of the necessary elements were met. Rule 42(c) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to bifurcate under some
circumstances.' Bifurcation, rarely happens, however, because "unitary trials
promote efficiency and serve the interest of justice by avoiding the scandal and
inequity of inconsistency."" Thus, in 1998, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that:
in a first-party bad faith action against an insurer, bifurcation and
stay of the bad faith claim from the underlying action are not
mandatory. Under Rule 42(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, a trial court, in furtherance of convenience, economy,
or to avoid prejudice, may bifurcate and stay a first-party bad faith
cause of action against an insurer."
Courts should consider several factors in deciding whether to bifurcate,
including the number of parties in the case; the complexity of the underlying case
against the insurer; whether undue prejudice would result to the insured if
discovery is stayed; whether a single jury will ultimately hear both bifurcated
cases; whether partial discovery is feasible on the bad faith claim; and the burden
placed on the trial court by imposing a stay on discovery."
B.

Attorney's Fees and Costs - Not for the Jury

If the jury finds that the defendant insurance company acted with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice, then the plaintiff is entitled to
recover attorney's fees and costs. The jury does not award these damages. The
McCormick, 475 S.E.2d at 519 (holding that the Thompson ruling makes it clear that the trial should not be
bifurcated, and that the resolution of the underlying policy claim must be made during the single trial (on all
sequential steps) in order for the jury to award damages for violation of the Act).
367

38

W. VA. R. Civ. P. 42(c):
Separate Trials.--The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or
of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues,
always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by Article III, Section
13 of the West Virginia Constitution or as given by a statute of this State.
State ex rel. Cavender v. McCarty, 479 S.E.2d 887, 894 (W. Va. 1996).

369

Light v. Allstate Insurance Company, 1998WL381663, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1998).

370

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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plaintiffs attorney must make a post-trial motion for a hearing on attorney's fees
and costs at which time the plaintiffs attorney will present the analysis of fees and
costs. The judge then makes a determination of how much, if any, of the attorney's
fees and costs will be charged to the defendant insurance company. Two different
approaches have been taken in West Virginia insurance misconduct cases regarding
the proper amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. In Hayseeds v. State Farm Fire
& Cas., the court held that attorney's fees should be equal to one-third of the face
amount of the policy, where the policy is not extremely large or extremely small."'
This result is based on the typical contingency fee arrangement. 2 The second view
taken by the court was in Landmark Baptist Church v. The BrotherhoodMut. Ins.
Co.."' In that case, the court held that
[t]he reasonableness of attorney's fees is generally based on
broader factors such as: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases."
Thus, in this second case, attorney's fees are not based on a mathematical
formula as in Hayseeds; instead, the judge has discretion to determine what fees
would be reasonable. We suggest that the approach in Landmark Baptist Church is
preferable because a mathematical formula based on policy amounts does not take
into account important factors such as the amount of extra time that the plaintiffs
attorney had to spend because of intentional delays by the defendant, and how
much time and money that plaintiff had to expend before bringing suit trying to
make the defendant honor its policy. An approach based on reasonableness is
arguably the more reasonable approach.
C.

Common Law and Statutory Theories Asserted Together

Both common law and statutory theories are always asserted together by
filing a two-count complaint. Although the plaintiff may not recover double
371

Hayseeds v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986).

372

Id.

373

484 S.E.2d 195 (W. Va. 1997).

374

Id. at 198.
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damages, asserting both theories may make recovery for aggravation,
inconvenience, attorney's fees, and costs easier. To illustrate, even if a plaintiff
does not substantially prevail on the underlying claim, which is required to recover
aggravation and inconvenience and attorney's fees under a common law theory, the
plaintiff might be able to recover these damages by showing that the company had
committed statutory violations with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice.
Unfortunately, bringing concurrent causes of action. for common law bad
faith and statutory misconduct has led to a great deal of confusion. For example, in
McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., the trial judge ordered that the trial be bifurcated.7 5
The issue of violation of common law duty of good faith was to be tried first. Then,
the statutory frequency step was to be tried, if necessary, along with the common
law elements of substantially prevailed and actual malice."' At the end of the first
phase, the amount that the jury found for the plaintiff was less than what the
plaintiff had initially demanded. The judge held that because the plaintiff had not
substantially prevailed, he could not go forward with the second phase of trialY
On appeal, the Court cleared up the confusion. It explained that a plaintiff need not
substantially prevail in order to bring a claim for an insurer's frequent violation of
subsection (9).378 To proceed to statutory sequential step three, the plaintiff need
only show that the underlying claim was ultimately resolved." One must be careful
not to confuse the sequential steps of a common law claim for misconduct with the
sequential steps of a statutory misconduct claim.
D.

EPJSA Preemption

There is one significant exception to the federal deference to state
insurance laws. The preemption clause of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) states that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of
this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III
of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ...

."" ERISA's saving clause,

however, states that "[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause],
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from

375

McCormick v. Allstate Ins, Co., 475 S.E.2d 507, 510 (W. Va. 1996).

376

Id. at 510.

377

Id.

378

Id. at 519.

379

Id. at 514-15.

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,44-45 (1987) (quoting section 514(a) as set forth in 29
U.S.C. section 1144(a)).
380
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any law of any state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities . . . ." , In
other words, the preemption clause does not apply to preempt state insurance laws.
In the deemer clause, however, the statute provides that
[n]either an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer ... or to be engaged in the business of insurance or
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts .... 382
To summarize, if a state law relates to employee benefit plans, then it is preempted
by ERISA. The saving clause, however, excepts laws that regulate insurance.' In
Dedeaux, the U.S. Supreme Court held that suit by an employee against his
employer's group insurance policy was preempted by ERISA.3" In Ball v. Life
PlanningServices, Inc., the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a suit against
an insurance broker for violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act'
was not preempted by ERISA.3 " Employee welfare benefit plans are exempt from
statutory insurance misconduct suits but are liable under ERISA 88
E.

Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for unfair claims settlement practices actions is
one year. 88
VII. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AND THE FUTURE
A.

Definitions
One of the biggest problems facing a plaintiff bringing a claim for

381

Id. at 45 (quoting §514(b)(2)(A) as set forth in 29 U.S.C. §1 144(b)(2)(A)) (emphasis added).

382

Id. (quoting §514(b)(2)(B) as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)).

383

See id.

384

Id. at 57.

385

Ball v. Life Planning Services, Inc., 421 S.E.2d 223 (W.Va. 1992).

388

W. VA. CODE§

387

Ball, 421 S.E.2d at 227.

33-1-4(9) (1996).

Id. at 224-27. In Ball, the plaintiffs' alternative cause of action was not preempted by ERISA. In
addition to a cause of action for unfair claim settlement practices, the plaintiffs brought suit for violation of
W. Va. Code section 33-12-2 1. That code section imposes personal liability upon an agent or broker who is
not licensed to transact insurance in West Virginia. See id.
388

389

See Wilt v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 506 S.E.2d 608, 614 (W. Va. 1998).
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statutory misconduct is determining the meanings of various terms in the
subparagraphs of West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(9)."' The West Virginia
Court has offered little insight into the meanings of many of the terms in the
statute. Because plaintiffs most often allege violation of subparagraph (f),39 it is
worthwhile to try to interpret the meaning of some of its terms. Subparagraph (9)
reads "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonablyclear" is an unfair
claims settlement practice.392 The terms in bold are the most important terms for
purposes of interpretation.
Definitions of good faith are hard to find. Three possible definitions of
"good faith" are suggested. First, the Oklahoma state code offers a good definition
of good faith: "[g]ood faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities
of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would
render the transaction unconscientious."39 3 Second, in Shamblin v. NationwideMut.
Ins. Co., the West Virginia Supreme Court suggests that good faith has something
to do with basing conduct on reasonable and substantial grounds, and according the
interests and rights of the insured at least as great a respect as its (the insurer's)
own.3 " Finally, good faith means that an insurer did not act unreasonably by failing
to compensate the insured, without proper cause, for a loss c6vered by the policy. If
coverage is fairly debatable and the insurer denies coverage, then it is not bad
39
faith.
"Prompt" should be defined by the state insurance regulations. Under the
regulations, an insurer must acknowledge the receipt of a notification of a claim or
respond to other pertinent communication within fifteen days; the insurer also has
fifteen days to commence any investigation.3 1 "Fair and equitable" should be
given a marketplace-type definition. As much as a fair and equitable price for a
house is whatever a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, a fair and equitable
settlement is what a reasonable insured would accept from a reasonable insurer.
The other significant term not defined by statutes, regulations, or the court
is when does liability become "reasonably clear." However, Massachusetts has
suggested two particularly compelling definitions. First, one court suggested that
liability is "reasonably clear" if the company "knew . . .that there was 'a

reasonable likelihood that ajury would return a verdict in favor of the defendants at
390

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996).

391

W. VA. CODE

§ 33-1 1-4(9)(0

392

W. VA. CODE

§ 33-1 1-4(9)(f) (1996) (emphasis added).

393

OKLA. STAT.

394

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 769 (W. Va. 1990).

395

See SHERNOFF, supra note 228, at §5.02[2].

396

W. VA. CODE STATE R. tit. 114 § 114-14-7 (1987).

(1996).

25, §9(1987).
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trial."' 397 This definition may be too speculative, and the use ofjury prediction may
make some lawyers uncomfortable. Thus, a second possible definition may be
offered whereby liability is defined as "reasonably clear" when "a reasonable
person, with knowledge of the relevant facts and law, would probably have
concluded, for good reason, that the insurer was liable to the plaintiff."398 Although
these definitions do not shed a bright light of clarity on the meaning of the West
Virginia statutes, they offer a possible guideline for a plaintiff who is in the dark. In
any case, the meaning of the terms remains a semantic mystery to the trier of bad
faith claims.
B.

The Future of The Act

The future of the West Virginia law of statutory misconduct should be one
free of confusion, whereby the intricacies of the law are further explained and
evaluated with each case the West Virginia Supreme Court hears. In addition, the
language of West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(9) may be rewritten to be more
liberal, because the model act promulgated by the NAIC has been amended by the
NAIC since it was adopted by the West Virginia Legislature. The most significant
change is that the initial language adds, as an alternative to proving that the
insurance company has acted with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice, that the action be "committed flagrantly and in conscious disregard of this
' An insured would
Act or any rules promulgated hereunder."399
no longer have to
prove multiple violations of the Act in order to assert a cause of action. The insured
would need to prove only that there was one violation that was committed
flagrantly and in conscious disregard of the Act. So far, only Georgia, Missouri,
and Nebraska have adopted the amended 1990 model."° However, other states that
have adopted a version of the Act could still enact the new version in the future.
The new version is more consistent with public policy. Under the present version of
the Act, if an insurance company committed a flagrant violation of the Act with
respect to one of its insureds, but it was the first time that the company committed
such a violation, and it violated only one of the subparagraphs of the Act, then the
insured could not recover under sequential step three of a cause of action for
statutory misconduct under the Act.

PART III: THIRD PARTY COMMON LAW BAD FAITH

397

Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Mass. 1983).

398

Demeo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 649 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).

399

See SHERNOFF, supra note 228,

400

Id.

§§ 6-56 to 6-59.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Insurance bad faith law began in the third party context. Third party bad
faith law applies when there is misconduct on the part of the insurer in handling a
claim by a third party claimant against the policy holder. The common law of third
party bad faith blossomed in its current form in Califomia in the 1950s and 1960s.
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals could have developed its
law in this area in the 1960s, this state failed to develop its law until 1990. Since
then, the court has attempted to shape the law in several cases, but many areas of
third party insurance bad faith law still remain unclear. This section will present the
history and national norms of third party bad faith common law and will address
the current state of the law. Lastly, this section will discuss some of the more
important issues of third party bad faith law that remain unclear or undecided.
II. HISTORY
A.

National

Bad faith insurance litigation is a relatively recent development in the
common law. It was generated in response to the inadequacies of contract law in
dealing with the insurer's breach of the duty to the insured. Prior to the cause of
action for bad faith, insurance companies acted without risk of having to pay
anything but the policy limits.'" For example, if the insurance company failed to
settle within the limits, the burden of paying the excess verdict fell on the insured,
not on the insurer. This result followed the common law rule of contract damages
set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale,'"2 that the only damages recoverable were those
that arose out of the breach itself or those that could be contemplated by the parties
when they entered into the contract.' ° In such a system, the capacity for abuse by
the insurer was immeasurable.
Courts began to recognize the harm caused by unfair settlement practices
in the 1930s and 1940s, and in response began to develop a tort law alternative to
the inadequate contract remedies.!0 The rationale used to justify the use of tort

401

STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONs §1:01 (1997).

402

156 Eng.Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).

403

See id. at 151.

404

See ASHLEY, supra note 401, at §1:01 (recognizing the increasing number of automobile claims).

See also Michael Sean Quinn, Insurance Bad Faith, Sic et Non, Texas Style, INSURANCE LITIGATION
REPORTER, 485 (August 15, 1997). Quinn states four reasons that state courts found contract law to be
insufficient for controlling insurer conduct:
First and foremost, states were struck by the asymmetry of the wealth and power which
usually obtains between insurers and insureds ....
Second, contract disputes are subject
to many technical defenses. The courts wanted to utilize the simpler and more flexible
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remedies in insurance coverage cases was the special nature of the relationship
between the parties to an insurance contract. Four specific aspects of the insurance
contract were frequently stated: (1) insurance contracts are considered contracts of
adhesion; (2) there is often a lack of equality in bargaining power between the
parties; (3) the insurance industry is one of quasi-public business nature; and (4) the
industry gives the insured 0 peace
of mind and protection against catastrophic
°
loss.
economic
and
personal
To establish a tort cause of action for bad faith, the court used the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing. This duty is implied in every contract and is
stated in the Restatement 2d of Contracts: "Every contract imposes upon each party
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.""o The
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing developed in contract law dealing with
subjective satisfaction of a contracting party. This duty was first imposed primarily
in situations in which one party was placed by the contract in a position to affect
substantially the other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract. Brassil v.
Maryland Cas. Co. was one of the earliest cases to expressly state that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing was owed by the insurer to the insured.4 7 The plaintiff
in Brassil was allowed to recover the expenses of appealing a judgment against the
insured after the insurer refused to prosecute the appeal. 0 8 The court in Brassil held
that the rights of the insured "go deeper than the mere surface of the contract
written for him by the [insurer]. Its stipulations imposed obligations
based upon
40 9
those principles of fair dealing which enter into every contract."
It was only natural for the courts to extend the duty of good faith and fair
dealing to insurance policies because of the fiduciary relationship that exists
between the insurer and insured. 40 The rationale for implying the duty was that the
insurer had absolute control over the conduct of the litigation and could reject
policy limit settlement offers in hopes of negotiating a better deal, without worry

tort law to regulate insurer conduct. . . Third, oracles of the law, including great and
distinguished judges such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, legal scholars, and law professors
who indoctrinate the young, have for many years taught that it is not in-and-of-itself
morally impermissible to breach a contract. Rather, the oracles have taught that contract
violation is either morally neutral, or even to be encouraged when it is economically
efficient. . . . Fourth, consequential damages are much harder to prove than regular
damages, and there are severe restrictions as to which damages actually count as
consequential.
Id. at 487-88.

405

See SHERNOFF, supra note 228, at §1.02.

406

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §205 (1979).

407

104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).

408

See id. at 624.

409

Id.

410

See SHERNOFF, supranote 228, at §1.07[2].
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that they would have to pay any more than the policy limits."' The implied
covenant of good faith gave courts the broader range of tort remedies to apply
when insurers mistreated their insured." 2 In crafting the rules for bad faith, the early
court decisions established liability based either on the insurer's negligent handling
of the case 3 or on its acting in bad faith.'' However, the different standards
amounted to the same thing and usually reached uniform results! 5
After Brassil"6 in 1914, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
remained dormant in the insurance context until 1931 when the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reasserted the concept in Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co.!7 Hilker involved
an action for bad faith failure to settle within the policy limits, and the insured
attempted to recover the amount of the excess judgment.1 The court took note of
the explosion of litigation surrounding automobile accidents and recognized a
problem where the insurer had complete control over the litigation process. 19 The
court recognized the logic in Brassil and quoted in its holding that "the rights of
the insured go deeper than the mere surface of the contract."'2 " The court implied
the duty of good faith because the insured bargains away all of his rights to settle
and defend' The court concluded that the duty of good faith would be met if the
insurer acted as a reasonably prudent person exercising ordinary care would act.41
The duty of good faith and fair dealing assumed the important role it
maintains in insurer/insured relations today in a series of California cases. In Brown
v. GuaranteeIns.Co.,/' an intermediate appellate court recognized that good faith
was the best description of the insurer's duty to the insured when it undertakes to
defend the insured against the claims of a third party claimant.'2 One year later, the
tort was firmly established by the California Supreme Court's decision in

411

See id.

412

See id.

413

See ASHLEY, supranote 401, at §2:04.

414

See id.at §2:05.

415

See id. at §2:06.

415

104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).

417

231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930).

416

See id.at 258.

419

See id.

420

Id.

421

See id.at 261.

422

Hilker 231 N.W. at 257 Syl. Pt. 4.

423

319 P.2d 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).

424

See id.
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Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins.Co.425 In Comunale, the California Supreme Court

stretched to come up with a new cause of action in order to save the plaintiff's case.
The plaintiff filed his cause of action after the expiration of the statute of
limitations for tort, but within that provided for contracts." Recognizing that the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract, the
California Supreme Court held that a bad faith action not only is in the nature of a
tort, but also includes aspects of contract law and may be brought under either
theory.42
430
Thus with Brassi428 and Hilker42 as a background, Comunale
set in

motion the current law of bad faith insurance litigation by firmly establishing an
independent cause of action when an insurer violates its implied duty under the
insurance contract to act in good faith. Since Comunale,43 virtually all states have
followed California's lead and have recognized the tort of bad faith in third party
insurance cases. "The mandates of these courts is clear: bad faith conduct and
unreasonable claims practices by the insurance industry will not be tolerated."432
B.

West Virginia

Less than ten years after the California Supreme Court's decision in
Comunale, West Virginia had the opportunity to follow California's lead by
adopting the tort of bad faith and begin defining its parameters. The West Virginia
Supreme Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity. As a result, West
Virginia lawyers, judges, and litigants wallowed in the uncertainty of the tort's
future in the state for nearly twenty-five years.
1.

Speicher v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Company

In 1966 in Speicher,43 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
asked to instruct the bench and bar about third party bad faith in West Virginia. In
Speicher, an insurer appealed a judgment for the insured awarding the amount of

425

328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).

426

See id. at 203.

427

See id.

428

104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).

429

231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930).

430

328 P.2d 198.

431

See id.

432

SHERNOFF,

433

Speicher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 151 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1966).

supra note 228, at §1:08.
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the plaintiff's excess verdict in the underlying case! 4' The court recognized the
need to educate the bench and bar as to the existence of the cause of action for bad
faith in West Virginia and the appropriate standard to be applied. However, the
court failed to so educate, and instead avoided the issue. Without expressly
recognizing the third party bad faith cause of action, the court stated that "[s]ince it
is the opinion of this Court ...that the [insurer] was guilty of neither negligence
nor bad faith, it will not be necessary .

.

. to go into detail in this opinion in

attempting to distinguish between them."435
2.

Richard E. Rowe: Insurance - Recovery of Excess Judgment from
Insurance Company"

The next step in the history of third party bad faith in West Virginia came
in the form of a student article in the West Virginia Law Review written by Richard
Edwin Rowe 7 in the wake of Speicher.438 Rowe predicted that the bad faith cause
of action would be recognized and that a good faith as opposed to negligence
standard would be applied.4"9 Rowe referred to a Virginia malpractice case that had
recently adopted the good faith standard instead of negligence."' Rowe also found
support for his prediction in a federal Southern District of West Virginia case that
decided an excess judgment case applying a "good faith" standard."' Rowe also
claimed that the West Virginia Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law was pertinent for
its statement that an insurance company "can discharge its legal obligations for the
amount of the policy covered by the act by a good faith settlement."' Rowe
concluded that
[s]ince the Virginia court and the District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, along with the West Virginia
Legislature in the Safety Responsibility Law have all endorsed the
434

Id. at 685 (the policy limits were $10,000.00, and the jury returned a verdict against the Speichers

for $16,000.00).
435

Id.

436

Richard E. Rowe, Comment, Insurance - Recovery of Excess Judgmentfrom Insurance Company,

70 W. VA. L. REV. 98 (1968).
437

Id.

438

151 S.E.2d 684.

439

Rowe, supra note 436, at 103.

440

Id. at 102 (citing Aetna Ca;. and Sur. Co. v. Price, 146 S.E.2d 220 (Va. 1966); Rowe admitted

that the Virginia case involved a malpractice claim, but the Virginia Court had used an automobile insurance
case as authority).
See id.(citing Inland Mut Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.W.Va. 1957).
441
442

Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
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"good faith" rule, it is most likely that when the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeal is confronted with the question they will
follow the majority and require that refusal to settle be a "good
faith" refusal.4 '3
3.

Daniels v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Company

Three years later, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the issue in an excess
verdict/failure to settle case arising out of the Southern District of West Virginia.'
The Fourth Circuit recognized in this diversity case that it was bound by West
Virginia law.4 ' Because no decision on the issue existed in West Virginia, the
Fourth Circuit was forced to make an "Erie educated guess."" The district court
believed that West Virginia would adopt a good faith standard and ruled in favor of
the insurer. "7 The Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered final judgment for the
plaintiffs in the amount of the excess verdict. "8
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit referred to its previous decision
in American Cas. Co. Of Reading, Pa. v. Howard"9 in which the court applied

South Carolina law. Quoting Howard, the Court held that "if the insurer acted
reasonably, in good faith and without negligence in refusing proffered settlements'
it met its obligations to the insured. This pronouncement is our text for decision
presently. It provides an understandable and a workable formula.""s" Ruling that the
insurance company was guilty of bad faith, the Fourth Circuit detailed the insured's
acts of bad faith and summarized them as follows:
(a) there was only a superficial investigation; (b) there was no
serious attempt to settle; (c) the company did not accept the
recommendations of its counsel and agents as to the amount it
should offer in settlement of the case; (d) there was only scanty
consideration given to the insured's predicament; and (e) there
was neglect in appraising the danger of the outstanding

443

Id. at 103 (citations omitted).

444

Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 ( h Cir. 1970).
4

445

See id. at 88.

446

See id.

447

See id.

448

Id. at 90.

449

187 F.2d 329 ( 4 h Cir. 1951).
Daniels,422 F.2d at 89.
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was required to pay a punitive damage award against the insured as well as the
amount of the compensatory damages in an excess judgment over the insurance
coverage available." 2 The third party claimants were injured when the insured
collided head on with their car." 3 At the time of the collision, the insured was drunk
and speeding.4 ' The insurance company refused to settle for the $10,000/$20,000
policy limits.46 This lawsuit was brought directly by the third party claimants. 4"
The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs in excess of the limits and with
punitive damages as well. 67 The court concluded that under the broad language of
the policy, an insurer is responsible for indemnifying the insured for punitive
damages awards so long as the insured's actions were not intentional but remained
in the gray area of gross, reckless, or wanton.6 6 Before the court answered this
question, it assumed that bad faith liability existed and that the third party could sue
the insurer directly for a wrongful failure to settle within policy limits. " This
decision will be discussed more fully in sections IV and VI.
6.

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

In 1990, the Shamblin decision for the first time expressly recognized the
cause of action for third party insurance bad faith in West Virginia.47 The decision
also set forth the standard to be applied.47 After Shamblin, an insurance company
may be liable for extra contractual damages if it handles a claim in such a manner
as to violate its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.472 If the plaintiff can
prove a violation of this duty, the insurer is then faced with the heavy burden of
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that it acted in good faith.47 The law as
established in Shamblin474 will be discussed fully in Section V.

462

See id at 228.

463

See id.

464

See id.

465

See id.

466

See Hensley,283 S.E.2d at 228.

467

See id.

468

See id. at 230.

469

See 1d. at228 n.1.

470

See Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 768 (W. Va. 1990).
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See id. at 776.

472

See id.
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See id.

474

See id.
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determination of liability."'
Thus, the Fourth Circuit predicted that the cause of action for bad faith
would be adopted in West Virginia.
4.

Vencill v. ContinentalCasualty Company

In 1977, the issue arose again in the Southern District of West Virginia,
this time in the context of a dispute between a primary and excess insurance
carrier." 2 In the underlying case, there was a dispute as to the exact amount of
coverage provided by the primary policy. 3 Upon an excess verdict against the
insured, the primary insurer paid what it felt were the policy limits, and the excess
insurer refused to pay at all." ' According to the excess carrier, the primary limits
had not been exhausted. 55 The insured and the third party plaintiffs sued both
insurers who filed cross claims against each other." The insurers settled with the
plaintiffs, and the case proceeded on the issue of the primary insurer's duty to the
excess carrier and the true amount of the primary insurance policy limits. '
First, the court ruled that the duty owed to the excess carrier by the
primary insurer was identical to that owed to the insured: "to act in good faith and
without negligence in the settlement of claims within the policy limits . .

.

Again recognizing that the issue was unsettled in West Virginia, the District Court
applied the Fourth Circuit test as stated in Daniels59 and found that the primary
insurer "acted neither reasonably nor in good faith, nor without negligence, in
attempting to settle the claims."460
5.

Hensley v. Erie Insurance Company

The first suggestion of a third party bad faith cause of action came in
Hensley."' The primary question in Hensley was whether an insurance company
451

Id.at 90.

452

Vencill v. Continental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.W.Va. 1977).

453

See id. at 1373.

454

See id.

455

See id. at 1375-76.

456

See id. at 1376.

457

See Vencill, 433 F. Supp. at 1376.

458

Id.

459

422 F.2d 87

460

Vencill, 433 F. Supp. at 1377.

461

Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).

h

(4"

Cir. 1970).
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III. NATIONAL LAW NoRMs

The national norm for liability in third party bad faith cases is one of good
faith and fair dealing. It is understood that neither party will do anything to harm
the other party to the contract. In the two decades since Comunale, the cause of
action for the tort of bad faith has expanded throughout the country. Courts differ in
this area of law on what actions will constitute a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing and on what standard should be applied to ascertain the existence
of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. This subsection discusses the
prevalent standards that have been adopted in jurisdictions throughout the United
States.
A.

FactorsTest

An early approach in deciding what constituted bad faith in failing to settle
within policy limits is known as the factors test. This test entailed the court's
delineation of a variety of factors to consider in determining whether the insurer
refused to settle in good faith. An example from an early California case states the
test as follows:
In deciding whether the insurer's refusal to settle constitutes a
breach of its duty to exercise good faith, the following factors

should be considered: [1] the strength of the insured claimant's
case on the issues of liability and damages; [2] attempts by the
insurer to induce the insured to contribute to a settlement; [3]
failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances so
as to ascertain the evidence against the insured; [4] the insurer's
rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; [5] failure of the
insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; [6] the
amount of financial risk to which the party is exposed in the event
of a refusal to settle; [7] the fault of the insured in inducing the
insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to
the facts; [8] and any other factors tending to establish or negate
bad faith on the part of the insurer. 75
The factors test has proved an impracticable guide for insurers deciding'
whether or not to reject the policy limits settlement offer.
B.

EqualityofInterests Test

The equality of interests test defines the insurer's duty in considering
whether to reject a settlement offer that is within policy limits, as a requirement that
475

Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal.App.2d 679, 689,319 P.2d 69, 75 (Cal. 1957).
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the insurer give the insured's interests at least the same amount of consideration as
it gives its own interests. Although the thought of this "egalitarian" approach is
reassuring, it too has proved difficult in application by courts and insurance
companies. The New Jersey Supreme Court highlighted the fundamental flaw in
the equal consideration standard:
Yet however much the carrier considers the interests of its insured
in pondering the decision as to settlement, the moment it decides
not to settle, it in effect, however reasonably, sacrifices the
interests of the insured in order to promote its own. It is always to
the benefit of the insured to settle and thereby avoid the danger of
an excess verdict. Since as insurer serves only its own interests by
declining to compromise within the insurance coverage, a decision
not to settle is perforce a selfish one. '
It is, therefore, apparently impossible for an insurer to make a decision
without violating this test.
C.

Disregardthe Limits Rule

In 1954, Professor Keeton proposed a modification of the equality of
interests test. The underlying idea of that modification was that "the equality
referred to is not equality weight in determination of the choice, but equality in
consideration - that is, consideration of each portion of the total risk without
regardto who is bearing that portion of the risk. '1"77 The insurance company must
make its decision as if there were no policy limit applicable to the claim. The
theory behind the proposal was that it would remove the insurance company's
institutional considerations from its decision making process.4 78 Keeton's proposal
was that the disregard the limits test was not new law, but merely an explanation of
the disregard the limits test. 79 Although several states have utilized its language,
this test also has its critics.9 "

476

ASHLEY, supra note 401, at §3:18 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.,

65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974)).
477

Id.at §3:19 (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67

HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1146 (1954)(emphasis supplied by Ashley)).
478

See id.

479

See id.

480

According to the New Jersey Supreme Court in its Rova Farmsdecision:
Even the rule requiring the carrier to form its judgment as though it alone were liable for
the entire risk may be polluted by institutional considerations which ignore the interests
of the specific insured involved .. . .These considerations may extend to a purpose to
keep future settlement costs down, to numb the public's claim-consciousness, to create a
conservative image for the discouragement of future claimants or to establish favorable
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ProbableOutcomes Test

According to Stephen S. Ashley, a fourth standard developing out of
California judges the insured's decision based on its evaluation of the possible
outcome of the third party claimants case. 81 According to Ashley, the cases "imply
that a prudent insurer, operating under a policy with no limits, would calculate the
reasonable settlement value of a claim based on the expected cost of the claim in
the eyes of a risk neutral decision-maker ....
[b]y focusing on outcomes and
'
probabilities, one excludes 'institutional considerations' from the equation."482
According to this modified standard, to determine whether the insurer properly
considered the possible outcomes without considering the policy limits, the claim
handler should consider the following factors:
(1) the legal facets of the case; (2) the probabilities of a verdict
and its anticipated range if adverse; (3) the strengths and
weaknesses of all the evidence; (4) the plaintiff's injury or harm;
(5) the experience and capacity of counsel; (6) verdicts awarded in
similar cases in the same jurisdiction; and (7) the relative
appearance and likely appeal of the witnesses. "'

IV. WEST VIRGINIA LAW OVERVIEW
A.

Hensley v. Erie Insurance Company

West Virginia third party bad faith law begins with Hensley v. Erie
Insurance Co."" Although the certified question before the court in Hensley was
whether it would be improper to force an insurer to pay the punitive damages
awarded against the insured,48 the most important part of the decision for bad faith
purposes was stated in the very beginning." The court began by assuming that an
insurer could be held liable for bad faith and that the injured third party could bring

precedents, none of which purposes has anything to do with the protection of the
particular insured at hand ....
ASHLEY, supra note 401, at §3:20 (quoting Rova Farms Resort,Inc. at 508).
481

Id. at § 3:21 (the cases to which he refers are Isaacson v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 44 Cal.3d

775, 750 P.2d 297,244 Cal.Rptr. 322 (1988); Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal.App.3d 739, 161 Cal.Rptr 322
(1980); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 110 Cal.Rptr 511 (1973)).
482

Id.

483

Id.

4"

283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).

48S

Id. at 227-28.

496

See id.
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a direct action against the defendant's insurance carrier. 87 The court praised the
trial court in reaching this conclusion.
The trial court, in a well-reasoned opinion, noted that this Court
had not decided whether the plaintiff in a tort action could bring a
direct suit against the defendant's insurance carrier for the excess
damages recovered over the insurance limits. This type of excess
is based on a claim that there was a wrongful failure to settle the
case within the insurance limits. 88'
The stage was now set for Shamblin."9
B.

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

The West Virginia landmark third party common law bad faith decision
came in Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., where the court finally established

the existence of the cause of action for bad faith in third party insurance
situations. 9" Shamblin dealt with a dispute about the total policy limits available to
the insured after an auto accident."' After the insurance company refused to settle a
trial was held.492 The liability jury returned a verdict in an amount that exceeded the
policy limits by almost $600,000.00.""3 Shamblin sued his insurer for bad faith
refusal to settle, and he sought to recover the amount of the excess verdict plus
additional damages. 9" The court recognized this cause of action and discussed the
standards to be applied to determine bad faith in the third party context. '
After Shamblin, whenever an insurer is afforded the opportunity to settle
within policy limits and it fails to do so, thus exposing the insured to personal
liability, "the insurer has prima facie failed to act in its insured's best interest and
such failure to so settle prima facie constitutes bad faith .

. . .""

Once a plaintiff

has established a prima facie case of bad faith failure to settle, the insurance
company must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it attempted to settle
487

See id. at 228 n.1.

488

Id.

489

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 296 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1990).

490

Id.

491

See id.at 769-70.

492

See id.

493

See id.at 771.

494

See Shamblin, 296 S.E.2d at 771.

495

See id. at 772-73.

496

Id. at 766 Syl. Pt. 2.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss1/4

64

Cady et al.: The Law of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct in West Virginia

1998)

INSURANCE COMPANY CLAIM MISCONDUCT

the case and that its failure to do so "was based on reasonable and substantial
grounds, and that it accorded the interests and rights of the insured at least as great
a respect as its own.""' The Shamblin Court then set forth a nonexclusive list of
factors to consider in deciding whether an insurer's decision to reject a policy limits
settlement offer was reasonable. 98
C.

State ex rel.Allstate Insurance Company v. Karl

In State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Karl,499 the court held that an
underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) carrier is analogous to an excess insurer,
and the defendant's primary personal injury liability carrier owes the UIM carrier
the duty of good faith in its defense of the claim." In Karl,the plaintiff was injured
when she was struck by a car driven by the defendant."' The plaintiff sued the
defendant and provided the suit papers to her insurer, Allstate, in compliance with
West Virginia's statutory provision concerning UIM coverage." 2 Both Allstate and
the defendant's primary insurer answered and commenced discovery. 3 The court
ordered the insurance companies to present a unified defense to be handled by the
defendant's liability insurer."'
UIM coverage is analogous to that of excess coverage based on the
language of the UM/UIM statute."'0 Because the primary liability lies with the
defendant's primary insurer, that company has the responsibility of defense, but in
such defense, it owes the UIM carrier the duty of good faith in defending the
claim."°

497
498

Id. at 766 Syl. Pt. 3.

Id. at 766 Syl. Pt. 4.
[T]he trial court should consider whether there was appropriate investigation and
evaluation of the claim based upon objective and cogent evidence; whether the insurer
had a reasonable basis to conclude that there was a genuine and substantial issue as to
liability of its insured; and whether there was potential for substantial recovery of an
excess verdict against its insured.

Id.
409

437 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1993).

500

See id. at 749 Syl. Pt. 5.

501

Id. at 753.

502

See id. at 752-53.

503

See id. at 753.

504

See Karl, 437 S.E.2d at 753.

505

Id. at 754.

506

See id. at 755-56.
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Poling v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company

In Poling v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,"" the court held that a settlement is
sufficient as ultimate resolution of the underlying claim,"0 8 that punitive damages
are appropriate so long as the defendant's conduct meets the standard of willful,
malicious, and intentional," 9 and that loss of consortium claims are proper in third
party bad faith claims. 1°
The accident in Poling was the classic third party insurance automobile
accident in which the plaintiff/third party was struck by the defendant's insured."'
The insured was drunk, driving his father's car without permission and without a
valid driver's license.'
The plaintiff's truck tumbled down a 300 foot
embankment, rendering it a total loss.1 3 There was no dispute over the property
damage claim; however, the defendant did dispute the severity of the plaintiff's
injuries."" Twelve months after the accident, the insurer agreed to settle for the
personal injury policy limits and for the total amount of property damage. 5 The
plaintiff refused to include the insurance company in its release, and later brought a
bad faith claim in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia." ' The federal court certified three questions to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. 1
On the first issue, the court ruled that "[a]lthough a voluntary settlement is
not a judicial determination, it is an ultimate resolution of a cause of action."" The
court noted that the insurance company knew it was not being released and held
that so long as the insurer is not included in the release, the release does not
preclude the bringing of an action for bad faith.1 The court also approved the
awarding of punitive damages in third party bad faith cases so long as the plaintiff
shows that the insurer knew that the claim was proper and "willfully, maliciously

507

450 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1994).

508

See id. at 635 Syl. Pt. 1.

509

See id. at 637-38.

510

See id. at 635 Syl. Pt. 4.

511

See id.at 636.

512

See Poling,450 S.E.2d at 636.
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See id.

514

See id.
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See id.

516

See id.

517

See Poling,450 S.E.2d at 636-37.
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Id.at 637.
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See id.
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and intentionally delayed payment in order to attempt to obtain a less than just
settlement.""52 Finally, the court ruled that the spouse of an injured person may
an independent claim for loss of consortium in a third party bad faith
maintain
1
case.

E.

52

State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Madden

In State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, the court held that
an action for bad faith may be brought at the same time that the underlying claim is
filed.5" The plaintiff in Madden was injured when he slipped and fell in the snow at
a Wendy's restaurant." In an amended complaint, the plaintiff sued both Wendy's
and its insurer, State Farm. 2' The defendants filed writs of prohibition seeking
review of several orders including the court's allowance of both actions and its
refusal to bifurcate the actions. 52 s
The court affirmed the trial court's decision to allow the plaintiff to sue the
insurer at the same time as the defendant."2 However, the court disagreed with the
lower court on the issue of bifurcation. 27 On that issue, the court held that the trial
court must bifurcate the actions:
under Rule 18(b), WVRCP [1978], an insurer may be joined as a
defendant with the insured by an injured plaintiff alleging claims
of bad faith and unfair insurance practices. However . . . [t]o

prevent undue prejudice to [the insured] any discovery or
additional actions against the insurer... must be stayed pending
resolution of the underlying suit. 2

520

See id. at 638.

521

See Id.

522

451 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1994).

523

See id. at 722.

524

See id. at 723 n.1 (the counts included negligence on the part of Wendy's, and both common law

bad faith and violation of the unfair insurance claim practices act against State Farm).
s25

See id. at 723.

526

See id. at 724.

527

See Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 724.
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Id.
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Charles v. State FarmAutomobile Ins. Company

In Charles v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 29 a train struck a car stalled on
railroad tracks, killing Deborah Jewell and injuring Stanley Bowen. 3 Complaints,
counterclaims, and cross claims ensued. Ultimately, the railroad company settled
with Jewell's estate for $50,000.00, and at trial, Bowen was found to be 100%
liable for Jewell's death."'1 Bowen's defense at trial was provided by State Farm,
the insurer of the car in which he and Jewel were riding. 32 State Farm made no
attempt to settle with the estate and throughout the litigation believed it would
avoid liability because of the lack of cooperation of Bowen in providing his
defense."'
The court rendered two decisions in Charles. The first opinion"a was
withdrawn and revised upon rehearing. In its first decision, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that Bowen was an additional insured under the
State Farm policy and that the Shamblin doctrine applied. 35 Justice Neely's
decision held that State Farm was responsible for the entire excess verdict, less the
amount of the railroad company's settlement, because it made no effort whatsoever
to settle.,5 6 As to the issue of Bowen's lack of cooperation in his defense, the court
held that it did not matter, for he was not the policy owner and "it would be absurd
to hold that the actions of itinerant n'er-do-well permissive user can bankrupt a
policy holder who, in any event, has no control over the n'er-do-well permissive
5 37
user."
On rehearing, the court withdrew its initial decision. 35 In the second
opinion, the court held that although Bowen was not the policy owner, he was an
insured and was entitled to Shamblin doctrine protection so long as he had not
forfeited his rights under Bowyer v. Thomas.139 The case was remanded to the

529

452 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1994).

530

See id. at 386.

531

See id. at 387.

532

See id. (the car was owned by Jewell's father, James Muncy).

533

See id. at 388.

534

Charles v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., No. 21662 (W. Va. June 15, 1994).

535

See id. at 1-2.

536

See id. at 7-8.

537

Id. at 4.

538

See Charles, 452 S.E.2d at 386.

See id. at 389 (citing Bowyer, 423 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1992) (providing that coverage is voided if
the insurer exercises reasonable diligence in attempting to obtain the insured's cooperation, the insured's
failure to cooperate is substantial and prejudicial, and the insured willfully and intentionally violated the
cooperation clause)).
539

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss1/4

68

Cady et al.: The Law of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct in West Virginia
INSURANCE COMPANY CLAIM MISCONDUCT

1998]

circuit court for determination of the Bowyer test." ° In dicta the court also stated the
following:
No one has yet suggested that the purpose of the Shamblin
doctrine is to protect victims, although the recent case of Marshall
v. Saseen, indicates that a victim may assert a bad faith against an
insurance carrier and demand that the carrier meet the Shamblin
standard to exonerate itself. Nonetheless, regardless of the final
contours of the law that has just been adumbrated in Marshall, it
is beyond cavil that the original Shamblin doctrine was created to
protect policyholders who purchase insurance to safeguard their
hard-won personal estates and then find these estates needlessly at
risk because of the intransigence of an insurance carrier."

This statement addresses the issue of whether a third party claimant may
bring a bad faith claim directly against the insurer, but it by no means settles the
issue. In fact, the next two cases discussed show that the federal courts in West
Virginia recognize that the issue has not been decided and establish a strict rule of
prohibiting direct common law bad faith actions against the insurer in the federal
district courts.
G.

Cross v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Company 2

In this case, the insured and third party claimant were involved in an
automobile accident."3 The insurer determined that its insured was liable and
contacted the third party claimant and attempted to settle.' The third party
claimant was unhappy with the offer and hired a lawyer."4 Thereafter, the insurer
refused to make any further payments until final resolution of the case. 6 The
underlying case was eventually settled, and this bad faith claim ensued. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the insurance company. 7 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment on the common law bad faith claim, holding that "the
district court correctly concluded that, like most other jurisdictions, West Virginia
would not allow third parties to assert common law causes of action for bad
540

See id. at 390.

541

Id. at 389 (citation and footnote omitted).

542

No. 96-1241, 1996 U.S. App. LExIs 33933 (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996).

543

See id. at *1.

544

See id. at *1-2.

545

See id. at *2.

548

See id.

u47

Cross, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 33933 at *2.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

69

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

faith." A8
H.

Penix v. Nationwide MutuaP4

This case also arose out of an automobile accident. The third party sued the
5
insured, and the claim was eventually settled."
The third party then sued the
insurer for common law bad faith and violation of the unfair insurance practices
act." ' In its order granting summary judgment for the insurer, the trial court judge
stated that "this court is unaware of any West Virginia decision which has allowed
a third-party claimant a direct right of action under an insurance policy for damages
beyond the coverage available under the policy."" 2
V. WEST VIRGINIA CAUSE OF ACTION

As opposed to the other three bad faith causes of action discussed in this
article, there are only three sequential steps in a third party common law bad faith
action: (A) resolution of the underlying claim, (B) bad faith, and (C) willful,
malicious, and intentional conduct. These three steps are discussed below.
A.

Underlying Claim Is Ultimately Resolved

The first sequential step is establishing that the underlying claim has been
ultimately resolved. Any final resolution will do, including judgment on a jury
verdict, summary judgment, or directed verdict. In addition, because the court held
in Poling that a settlement between the plaintiff and the insured is an ultimate
resolution for purposes of proceeding with a bad faith claim, a jury verdict or
judicial disposition is not necessary. 3
Although the underlying claim must be ultimately resolved as a
prerequisite to seeking recovery of bad faith damages, the insurer may be joined in
an action against the insured or added by an amended complaint in the underlying
action." The complaint in Madden, filed by the third party plaintiff, alleged not
only negligence on the part of the insured, but also counts of both statutory and
common law bad faith against the insurer."' Although combination of these causes
548

Id at *3.

549

No. 2:95-0525 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 10, 1995).

550

See id.

551

See id.

552

Id.

553

Poling,450 S.E.2d at 637.

554

Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 722 Syl. Pt. 1.
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See id. at 722 n.I.
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of action is allowed, they must be bifurcated, and discovery on the bad faith issue
must be stayed and kept separate from the liability claim discovery."5 A plaintiff
may also amend the complaint after judgment to add allegations of bad faith upon
resolution of the underlying claim.5" There is a clear benefit to the insured in
allowing joinder of the two claims, for it will usually prevent removal of the bad
faith cause of action to federal courts.
When ultimate resolution of the underlying claim is established, the insurer
will be liable to the plaintiff insured for any award of damages against the insured
in the amount of the underlying verdict up to the policy limits. Once ultimate
resolution is determined, the question becomes whether the insurance company's
actions in the underlying claim constitute bad faith.
B.

BadFaith

The next second step in the third party common law bad faith context is the
establishment of bad faith. West Virginia law is unique in this area. The plaintiff
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of bad faith."5 8 If the insured
can establish an act of bad faith, then the burden shifts to the insurer to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that it acted in good faith.
The Shamblin court provided a list of factors that the trier of fact should
consider in determining whether an insured's refusal to settle was reasonable and in
good faith.5 9 These include whether there was appropriate investigation and
evaluation of the claim "based on objective and cogent information;" whether the
insurer had a reasonable basis to question the existence of a "genuine and
substantial issue as to liability of its insured;" and whether there existed a
"potential for substantial recovery of an excess verdict of [the] insured."" The
court stressed that all of these factors could and should be considered independent
of each other. 1 The court also hinted at a fourth factor, an affirmative requirement
of seeking settlement. 2
What the insurer must prove by clear and convincing evidence is that it
acted as a reasonably prudent insurance company would, and did so whil affording
the insured's interest at least as much consideration as it gave its own, and the

See id. at 722 Syl. Pt. 2.
S57

Id.
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See Shamblin,396 S.E.2d at 768 Syl. Pt. 2.
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See id.
at768 Syl. Pt. 4.
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See id.
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See id.

"Likewise it is the insured's burden to act in good faith in actively seeking settlement and release
of its insured from personal liability, as opposed to the obligation being solely on the injured party, his
attorney or the insured." See id. at 777.
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insurance company must always be mindful of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing under the policy. 3 While the Shamblin decision dealt with the insurer's
liability for bad faith in rejecting a policy limits settlement offer, however, there is
no reason to believe that liability for bad faith is solely applicable to this situation.
Other acts of bad faith for which a plaintiff may sue are discussed in the next
subsection.
The clear and convincing standard pushes the insurer's burden of proof to
the boundary of strict liability. The court has not elaborated on the clear and
convincing standard in the bad faith context; however, it has been discussed in the
area of libel and slander.'

"[C]lear and convincing evidence is ...

more than a

mere preponderance of evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence
which is so clear, explicit and unequivocal as to leave no substantial doubt and
which is sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable
mind."" s Black's Law Dictionary defines the standard as:
that proof which results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the
ultimate fact in controversy. Proof which requires more than a
preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Clear and convincing proof will be shown
where the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."8
This is an extraordinarily difficult obstacle for the insurer and one which is unique
to West Virginia in third party bad faith law.
A plaintiff who prevails under the second sequential step is entitled to a
broad range of tort related damages. The insurer will be liable for consequential
and compensatory damages. This will include the amount of the excess verdict
rendered against the insured. The insurer will also be liable for the plaintiff's net
economic loss as well as damages for aggravation and inconvenience and
emotional distress. Emotional distress damages include compensation for anger,
anguish, chagrin, depression, disappointment, embarrassment, fear, fright, grief,
horror, humiliation, shame, and worry. In addition, a plaintiff may recover from the
insurance company the plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs associated with bringing
the underlying action.
Bad faith experts have harshly criticized the court for the law as it is set
forth in Shamblin. The editors of the Bad Faith Law Report call Shamblin "cruel
and unusual punishment" and "the worst bad faith decision published in the reports

56

See id. at 768 Syl. Pt. 4.
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See generally Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975).

565

Id. at 698.
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6' h ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
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of American courts." ' Another bad faith expert termed the decision "unusual."
C.

8

Willful, Malicious, and Intentional

The final step in third party bad faith cases is proof of willful, malicious,
and intentional conduct for purposes of recovering punitive damages. Punitive
damages are available where the plaintiff can establish that the insurer (1) knew
that the claim was proper and (2) acted willfully, maliciously, and intentionally in
failing to settle the claim. 9 In Poling, the court couched the second element of
actual malice as willfully, maliciously, and intentionally "delay[ing] payment in an
attempt to obtain a less than just settlement."" 0 If the plaintiff can establish that the
insurer knew that a claim was proper and acted in a way that rises to the level of
willful, malicious, and intentional misconduct, the final sequential step is satisfied,
and an insurer will be liable for punitive damages in addition to the damages
recoverable under the two previous steps.
VI. QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND THE FUTURE
Because West Virginia began developing its bad faith law comparatively
late, several important questions remain unanswered or unclarified. This section
will address some of the more important issues.

A.

May Third PartyClaimants BringDirectActions for Bad FaithAgainst an
Insurer?

All states have rejected the right of a third party claimant to bring a direct
bad faith common law cause of action against an insurer. Courts conclude that the
duty owed under the implied covenant of good faith protects the insured and is not
available to protect strangers to the insurance policy." Although courts have
generally held against the claimant's direct cause of action, most allow assignment
of the insured's cause of action against the insurer.' This transaction is normally
Bad Faith Law Report, at 219 (Dec., 1990). The editors finished their criticism with the following
warning to insurance companies who sell policies in West Virginia "if you decide to reject a policy limits
settlement offer, you might as well waive your limits and save yourself the horrendous expense of litigation
in Vest Virginia. Adjust your rates accordingly." Id.
at 220.
567
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PAT MAGARICK, EXCESS LIABILITY: THE LAW OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF INSURERS

§ 10.04 (3d ed. 1994).
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See Poling,450 S.E.2d at 638.
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Id.
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See

ASHLEY,

supra note 401, at §6.09; SHERNOFF, supra note 228, at §2.04[2]; see also

Annotation, Right of Injured Person Recovering Excess Judgment Against Insured to Maintain Action
Against Liability InsurerforWrongful Fatlureto Settle Claims,63 A.L.R.3d 677 (1975).
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See id.
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contained in the settlement and release in which the third party claimant receives
the assignment in consideration for releasing the insured from liability under the
judgment in the underlying claim." 3
In 1998, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ended the confusion
over cases by third party claimants. 4 On August 10, 1990, Chester Workman
crossed the center line and collided with Mr. Elmore's car, killing his pregnant wife
and unborn child and injuring Mr. Elmore and his three-year-old son. 5 Workman
was insured by State Farm for $300,000 (per occurrence) and Mr. Elmore had
underinsured motorist coverage with Allstate."' Defendant Roberta Paugh, a State
Farm adjuster, told Mr. Elmore "that he would not receive the entire $300,000 ...
because $100,000 was being retained ...

to settle the claims of the passengers in

the Workman vehicle. Allstate instructed [Mr. Elmore] to first settle with State
Farm before filing his claim for underinsured coverage with Allstate." S Mr.
Elmore told State Farm that he wanted to get an attorney, but Defendant Paugh
talked him out of it, saying that he was getting the maximum that the policy could
pay anyway. 8 Mr. Elmore signed the releases pro se."' Unknown to Mr. Elmore,
State Farm had paid only approximately $58,000 of the $100,000 it had reserved
for the passengers in Mr. Workman's car." Mr. Workman subsequently made a
claim to Allstate for his underinsured motorist coverage, but for two years the
claim was neither paid nor denied. 8 ' Finally, Mr. Elmore filed suit against State
Farm, Allstate, and the claims adjusters claiming bad faith. 2 Allstate denied
coverage on the basis that Mr. Elmore had not received all of the policy limits from
State Farm. 3 State Farm quickly paid Mr. Elmore the difference, thereby reaching
the policy limits of Mr. Workman's policy. 4 Mr. Elmore alleged a breach of
fiduciary duty and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against State
Farm, Allstate, and the claims adjusters.8
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See id.

574

See Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1998).
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Id. at 895.
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Id.at 894.
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Id. at 895.
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Elmore, 504 S.E.2d at 895.
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Elmore, 504 S.E.2d at 895.

585

Id. at 897.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss1/4

74

Cady et al.: The Law of Insurance Company Claim Misconduct in West Virginia

1998]

INSURANCE COMPANY CLAIM MISCONDUCT

The court determined that the common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing is a duty based on contract.' Because there is no contractual relationship
between a third party and a liability insurer, there can be no bad faith and hence no
direct action by a third party against an insurance company. 87 The court noted at
length, however, that this decision does not affect the third party's right to sue an
insurer for violation of the Statutory Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. 88
B.

What is the AppropriateStatute ofLimitations?

In Comunale v. Traders and Gen. Ins. Co.,"' the California Supreme Court
held that the cause of action for bad faith sounds in both tort and contract law, and
therefore, the plaintiff may select between these theories and be subject to the
applicable limitations period. Although it is difficult to generalize, most states have
adopted as the applicable time period the normally longer period allowed under
statutes of limitations for causes of action arising under written contracts.8 Under
West Virginia's statute of limitations, the applicable time period for an action on a
tort that was not recognized under common law is one year." 1 The applicable time
period for an action on a written contract is ten years, and on an implied contract it
is five years. "2 Although the insurance policy is a written contract, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied in every insurance contract. In this area,
the court will probably follow the majority and hold that the appropriate statute of
limitations period is that of an implied contract, thus requiring that bad faith actions
be brought within five years.
C.

Defenses Available to the Defendant/Insurer

Two frequently discussed defenses that may be available to the insurer are
comparative bad faith and reverse bad faith. These concept are recent developments
in bad faith law and have received limited acceptance, mainly in California. Both
are mentioned here because of their possible future application in West Virginia.
1.

Comparative Bad Faith

When courts speak of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, they
586

Id.

587

Id.

588

Id. at 902 (citing W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996)).
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328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).

s90

See ASHLEY, supranote 401, at §7.05; SHERNOFF, supranote 228, at §20.07[3][a].

So1

W. VA. CODE §55-2-12 (1994).
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W. VA. CODE §55-2-6

(1994).
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recognize this as a duty not only of the insurer but also of the insured. The insured
also covenants that it will do nothing to interfere with the insurer's ability to
perform its obligations under the contract. When raised as a defense, the insured's
bad faith has been termed comparative bad faith. This defense is based upon
comparative fault principles in tort law. It is used in attempt to lessen the amount of
extra contractual damages sought by the insured.
The insured's conduct may affect the insurer's ability to handle the claim
in several ways. The conduct may affect the speed, accuracy, or cost of handling
the claim.593 Likewise, if the plaintiff's conduct occurs after the insurer has already
acted wrongfully, it may increase the size of damages resulting from the insurer's
wrongful conduct. 94 The comparative bad faith defense would put before the trial
court the question of the plaintiffs bad faith in the claims process as well as the
insurer's bad faith conduct. The fact finder would make the decision as to the
percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff, and the bad faith verdict would be
diminished accordingly.
The question of whether to allow a defense of comparative bad faith leads
to several more questions that must be addressed for proper application according
to one writer.
The adoption of a comparative fault scheme would add four
decisional steps to the factfinder's task. First, by what standard
should the insured's conduct be judged, and are there categories of
conduct that should not count at all towards the defense? Second,
was this conduct an actual cause of the injury or damages for
which the insured seeks recovery? Third, was this conduct a
proximate cause of the damages for which the insured seeks
recovery? Fourth, what is the respective responsibility of both the
carrier and the insured?595
Because this defense is closely related to usual comparative tort principals,
an insurer would be advised to assert the defense in its initial responsive pleading
to guard against waiver.
2.

Reverse Bad Faith

Reverse bad faith is an independent cause of action by the insurer against
the insured. This claim seeks to recover damages that the insurer has suffered as a
result of the insured's misconduct. Examples of such damages may include

593

See Ellen Smith Pryor, Comparative Fault and Insurance Bad Faith, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1505,

1510 (1994).
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See id.
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Id. at 1533.
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payment made to an innocent co-insured, payment made to a mortgagee for loss
occasioned by an insured's fraud such as arson, investigation costs incurred that
revealed the insured's fraud, and loss of subrogation rights."
D.

Other PrimaFacieCases ofBad Faith

Third party common law bad faith arose out of conflicts over the insurer's
failure to settle. Although that is generally the context in which third party bad faith
is addressed, courts have not confined the idea of bad faith conduct only to a failure
to settle within policy limits. Courts from around the country have characterized the
nature of bad faith conduct as "affirmative misconduct, without good faith defense,
in a malicious, dishonest, or oppressive attempt to avoid liability,"597 or "arbitrary,
reckless, indifferent or intentional disregard of the interests of the person owed a
duty."598 These descriptions reveal many examples of conduct that would constitute
aprimafaciecase of third party bad faith.
Examples of other conduct that courts have deemed bad faith and allowed
recovery include 1) failure to advise insured to retain separate counsel, 99 2) failure
to defend,"0 0 and 3) improper or ineffective defense.6 ' A variety of sources give
examples of third party bad faith in West Virginia. One such source is West
Virginia's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. 2 Actions delineated in the
statute that would apply to third party cases include [1] misrepresenting pertinent
facts or insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at issue;603 [2] failing to
acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to
claims arising under insurance policies;6 [3] failing to adopt and implement
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance
policies; 0. [4] refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation
based upon all available information;" [5] delaying the investigation or payment of
claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or the physician of either to submit a
preliminary claim report and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal
59

See SHERNOFF, supranote 228, at §30.03[2].
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First Maine Ins. Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1994).
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Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Mich. 1986).
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1 JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FAITH § 2.8 (5 t , ed. 1990).
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Id. at § 2.9.
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Id. at § 2.10.
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W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE § 33-1 1-4(9)(c) (1996).

606

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(d) (1996).
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proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same
information;... [6] failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become
reasonably clear, under one portion of the policy coverage in order to influence
settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage;.. 8 [7] failing to
promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in
relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a
compromise settlement." 9
IV. THIRD PARTY INSURANCE STATUTORY CLAIMS MISCONDUCT
I. INTRODUCTION

This section of the article concerns statutory claims misconduct by a
liability insurer. Claims misconduct usually occurs due to unfair trade practices or
unfair settlement practices. West Virginia Code sections 33-1 1-1 et. seq. contains
the state's Unfair Trade Practices Act, 10 which prohibits unfair trade practices as
well as unfair claims settlement practices.6 ' It expressly provides for administrative
remedies. 12 In addition, five jurisdictions, including West Virginia, have judicially
construed the Act to allow for a private cause of action. 13 In West Virginia, a
private cause of action may be brought by the third party insured against his own
insurer or by the third party claimant against the liability insurer."1
A typical cause of action for statutory misconduct consists of four
sequential steps: 1) ultimate resolution of the underlying claim, 1' 2) proof that the
insurance company violated the statute, 16 3) frequency of violations as to indicate a
general business practice, ' and 4) willful, malicious, and intentional conduct."'
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§ 33-11-4(9)(1) (1996).
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§ 33-11-4(9)(m) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE § 33-1 1-4(9)(n) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE § 33-11-I to -10 (1996).
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W. VA. CODE§ 33-11-4(9) (1996).
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The other states are Kentucky, see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky.
1989); Montana, see Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1983); and North Dakota, see Farmer's Union
Cent. Exch. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1985).
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See Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 258.
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See, e.g., Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 491 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1996).
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This section of the article will survey the history of third party insurance statutory
claims misconduct in both the nation and West Virginia. Additionally, this section
will analyze the national law norms, West Virginia law, and the West Virginia
cause of action.
II. HISTORY
A.

National

Insurance regulation is primarily a state rather than a federal responsibility.
In 1944, in United States v. Southeastern UnderwritersAss 'n,"' the Supreme Court
held that insurance companies were subject to the federal anti-trust laws. 20
Response to Southeastern was swift. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act.'21 After concluding that "state regulation and taxation of the
insurance business is in the public interest," Congress gave the power to regulate
insurance companies to "the several states."'" Federal law does not supersede state
law unless the federal law specifically relates to insurance."z General federal
legislation regulating trade practices is therefore inapplicable to insurance to the
extent that state law governs insurance practices.
In response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 24 each state was encouraged to
enact its own laws regulating insurance. Forty-five states adopted the Model Unfair
Trade Practices Act promulgated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC).' To be effective, these acts should be interpreted liberally
and construed to prevent federal entry.
B.

West Virginia

West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act, codified at sections 33-11-1 to
-10,626 contains eleven subsections.'27 The Act prohibits 15 unfair claim settlement

618

See Dodrill,491 S.E.2d at 1.

619

322 U.S. 533 (1944).

620

Id. at 562.

621

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994).

622

15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).

The only exceptions are the Sherman Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1994); Clayton Act, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27,44 (1994); and the Federal Trade Commission Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
623
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See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994).
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See SHERNOFF, supranote 228, at § 6.03[2].
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practices.62 Nine of the sub-paragraphs apply to third party claims. 29 The most
litigated subsection is the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act codified at West
Virginia Code section 33-1 1-4(9).3 In Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that section 33-11-4(9) allows a
private cause of action63' in a third party claim. In reaching that decision, the court
used the four-part test from Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp.:632
(1) the plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted; (2) consideration must be given to
legislative intent, express or implied, to determine whether a
private cause of action was intended; (3) an analysis must be made
of whether a private cause of action is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) such
private cause of action must not intrude into an area delegated
exclusively to the federal govemment."9
The main argument in Jenkins was whether the plaintiff was "a member of
the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted."" The insurer contended that if
the statute did provide for a private cause of action, it was only intended to cover
insureds. 3 The insurer based its contention on Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., an
Illinois case." The Scroggins court held that the statute could allow for a third
party cause of action, but concluded that an insurer's duty always runs to its
insured. 37 The West Virginia court, however, construed the insurer s duty under the
statute as independent of its duty under the contract with its insured. 3 The court
held that the broad language in section 33-11-4(9) (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (in), and (n)
was applicable to both first and third party claims. 39 Reference to both "insureds"
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Id.
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Id.
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See Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 255-56.
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W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996).
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See Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 258.
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262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980).
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and "claimants" in sub-paragraphs (k) and (1)"suggest[ed] a clear legislative
intent that claimants are entitled to protection under this Act."'' The second part of
the Hurley test concerns legislative history. Although there was no legislative
history concerning the Act,"' subsection 33-11-6(c) indicated that the
administrative provisions in the statute "will not absolve any person affected by
such order or hearing from any other liability, penalty or forfeiture under the
law."' A private cause of action was also consistent with the underlying
legislative purpose, which was to prevent improper settlement practices."4 The final
factor mentioned in Hurley is whether the private cause of action under the state
statute was preempted by federal law.6" As previously stated, insurance regulation
has been left to "the several states" and is not a "delegated federal concern."''
Since Jenkins, a private cause of action exists for violations of West Virginia Code
section 33-11-4(9) for third party claims.'
III. NATIONAL LAW NORM

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is made up
of the top insurance regulation officials of each state. The NAIC's Model Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act was adopted by forty-five states, including West
Virginia." 7 The Model Act does not expressly provide for a private cause of action
for violations but gives the state's insurance commissioner the authority to order
the insurance company to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair claims
practice. ' The commissioner may also, at his discretion, order payment of
penalties or suspension or revocation of the insurer's license." 9 If the insurer
violates a cease and desist order, the commissioner can order further penalties.'
Most states do not recognize a private cause of action under the NAIC Act.
Only four states allow a judicially implied private cause of action.'51 In
640

Id. at 256.
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W. VA. CODE § 33-11-6(c) (1996) (stating that "[the administrative provisions will not] absolve

any person affected by any such order or hearing from any other liability, penalty or forfeiture under law.")
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Jenkins,280 S.E.2d at 256.

647

See SHERNOFF, supranote 228, at § 6.03[2].
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1979, in Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., California became the first state to

permit a private cause of action." 2 Additionally, Florida has expressly authorized a
private cause of action for violations of its Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Act.653 Florida state statute section 624.155 applies to "any person,"" thus
allowing a third party private cause of action.55 In 1981, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, in Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co.," followed

California's lead. West Virginia remains in a small minority of states that have held
that their unfair trade practices acts convey a private cause of action. California
overruled Royal Globe in 1987 in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.."

Thus, California no longer recognizes a private cause of action under its unfair
claims settlement statute.55
IV. WEST VIRGINIA LAW-OVERVIEW

West Virginia, like the majority of states, has adopted a version of the
NAIC's Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.655 Like the Model Act, the
West Virginia statute did not expressly provide for a private cause of action against
violators of the statute. In 1981, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held in Jenkins that a violation of the statute could give rise to a private
cause of action." ° Since 1981, only seven third party statutory misconduct decisions
have been made in West Virginia: six by the Supreme Court of Appeals" and two
by the Fourth Circuit. 2 Even though not all sections of the Act have been
analyzed, recent cases suggest that the court is still in agreement with its holding in
Jenkins. 3 Later cases have expanded on Jenkins, making it easier to pursue claims
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592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
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See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1997).
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280 S.E.2d at 252.
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758 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1988).
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Id.

659

W. VA. CODE
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Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 252.
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See Grove v. Myers, 382 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989); Robinson Fidelity & Dep. Co., 383 S.E.2d 95

§ 33-11-4(9) (1996).

(W. Va. 1989); Robinson v. Continental Cas, Co., 406 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1991); Russell v. Amerisure Ins.
Co., 433 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1993); State ex reL State Farm v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994);
Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996).
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See Cross v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 96-1241, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 33933 (4' Cir.
1996); Mirandy v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 97-1966 (4' Cir. 1998).
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See, e.g., Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 721; Dodrill,491 S.E.2d at 1.
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against an insurer for unfair claims settlement practices.'
A.

Statutes thatApply to ThirdPartyClaimants
1.

W. Va. Code Section 17D-4-12(f)(3)

West Virginia Code section 17D-4-12(f)(3) states that "[t]he insurance
carrier shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, and if such
settlement is made in good faith, the amount thereof shall be deductible from the
limits of liability specified in subdivision (2), subsection (b) of this section."""5
Despite no published decisions, following the precedent set in Jenkins, a private
cause of action is likely for violation of the section. The problematic language is
"and if such settlement is made in good faith."' "Good faith" has not been
defined by the West Virginia courts.
2.

W. Va. Code Section 33-11-4 (1)-(11)
a.

General

West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act, 7 patterned after the NAIC's
Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, consists of eleven subsections. This article is
concerned mostly with the section containing the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act."8 Like the Model Act, West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act
identifies fifteen separate Unfair Claims Settlement Practices." This article deals
with those provisions that apply to third party claims. The court has not yet heard
cases under all of the sub-paragraphs. All of the third party cases have dealt with
sub-paragraph 9(f).
b.

Sub-paragraphs applicable to third party claims

The nine subsections of 33-11-4(9) applicable to third party claims are
sections (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (k), (I), (m), and (n). 70 The only published decisions
concern subsection (f). Subsection (a) prohibits misrepresentation of pertinent facts

6

See id.

665

W. VA. CODE§

sw

Id.

667

W. VA. CODE

668

W. VA. CODE § 33-I 1-4(9) (1996).

669

Id.

670

See Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 255-56.

17D-4-12(f)(3) (1996).

§ 33-11-I

to -10 (1996).
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or provisions. 71 The subsection seems to be clear enough, although the word
"pertinent" may be a litigation breeder. Subsection (b) concerns failure to
acknowledge and act reasonably promptly with respect to claims. 72 The meaning of
"reasonably promptly" would likely arouse debate. Subsection (c) involves
implementing reasonable standards for prompt investigation of claims. 73 The words
"reasonable standards" are likely to cause disagreement. Subsection (d) prohibits
refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation.7 Again, the
question is, "What is reasonable?" Subsection (f) prohibits "not attempting in
good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which
liability has become reasonably clear.""67 This subsection is the most litigated.
Every West Virginia third party case has involved this subsection. Two parts of
subsection (f) arouse debate in court: what constitutes good faith and when liability
is reasonably clear. Subsection (k) prohibits "[m]aking known to insureds or
claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or
claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or compromises
less than the amount awarded in arbitration."' 76 Subsection (1)
prohibits delaying
77
investigation or payment of claims. This subsection seems clear. Subsection (in)
concerns the failure to promptly settle claims under one portion of the policy in
order to influence settlements under other portions. 76 The reasons for delaying
settlement of a portion of the claim would likely be argued by the parties. Finally,
subsection (n) concerns failure to provide a reasonable explanation for denial of a
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.7 This subsection appears simple
enough.
B.

Regulations

West Virginia has also adopted Unfair Trade Practices Regulations that
define "unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices."6
There are no published third party decisions concerning violation of the
regulations.
671

W. VA.CODE § 33-11-4(9)(a) (1996).

672

W. VA. CODE §33-11-4(9)(b) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE§ 33-1 1-4(9)(c) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE § 33-1 1-4(9)(d) (1996)
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W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)( 0 (1996).
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W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(k) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE§33-1 1-4(9)(I) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE§33-11-4(9)(m) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE§ 33-I 1-4(9)(n) (1996).
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W. VA. CODE OF STATE R. tit. 114 § 14(l) (1987).
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V. WEST VIRGINIA CAUSE OF ACTION

A.

Introduction

A complete cause of action for third party violation of the West Virginia
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act contains four sequential steps: 1) ultimate
resolution of the underlying claim, 2) violation of the statute, 3) violations
committed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, and 4)
willful, malicious, and intentional conduct. The third party plaintiff does not have
to prove all four elements in order to win a judgment against the insurance
company. Rather, damages are awarded for the successful completion of each step.
If the third party plaintiff proves the first element, he is awarded damages up to the
policy proceeds. If he can also prove the second and third elements, violation of the
statute committed with such frequency to indicate a general business practice, he is
also awarded damages for aggravation and inconvenience: emotional anguish,
chagrin, depression, disappointment embarrassment, fear, fright, grief, horror,
humiliation, shame and worry, attorney's fees, costs, excess over policy limits,
expenses, loss of consortium, and net economic loss. If, in addition to sequential
steps 1, 2, and 3, the third party plaintiff proves the insurance company's conduct
was willful, malicious, and intentional, he is entitled to punitive damages.681
B.

SequentialSteps in a Third PartyCause ofAction
1.

Sequential Step One: Ultimate Resolution of the Underlying
Claim

The first element of a third party private cause of action is that the
underlying liability claim must be ultimately resolved. Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas.
Ins. Co. 82 was the first case. After a car accident caused by another driver, Sharon
Jenkins brought a direct action against the defendant's insurer for statutory bad
faith." The trial court dismissed the case against the insurer because there was no
private cause of action for violation of the statute.'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that there was an
implied private cause of action under the Act. 88 The direct action against the
insurer, however, would have to wait until the underlying claim was ultimately

681

See Dodrill,491 S.E.2d at 14.

682

280 S.E.2d 252 (1981).
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Id. at 254.
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Id.
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Id. at 258.
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resolved." At that time, the issues of liability and damages would be settled, and
the insurer's actions in settling the claim could be viewed in light of the outcome of
the underlying case.687 Without a verdict in the liability claim, it would be difficult
to decide whether a settlement offer was fair6" or whether liability was reasonably
clear at the time of the settlement offer. 8 The two adversarial parties would be
expected to disagree as to whether the settlement offer was fair or the liability was
reasonably clear. 9 Jenkins did not mention when the underlying case would be
considered ultimately resolved. Once a jury had reached a decision in the
underlying case, it would be easier to determine whether liability was reasonably
clear at the time of the settlement offer. The amount offered by the insurance
company to settle all claims could be viewed in light of the damages awarded by
the jury.
In Robinson v. Continental Casualty Co.," 1 the plaintiff sued the insurance
company after the trial court verdict in the underlying case. 92 The plaintiffs began
discovery in preparation for the second suit. " 3 Discovery entailed not only requests
for the insurer's claims files, but also depositions of the insurer's employees." The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that to allow the plaintiffs to proceed
with their suit against the insurance company and particularly to proceed with
discovery would prejudice the underlying case then on appeal. " The court stated
that "ultimately resolved" means exactly "what it appears to mean, . . . resolved
after any and all appeals.""8 The issues of whether the settlement offered was fair
or the liability was reasonably clear are not resolved until the appeals process is
finished. Also, if on appeal the trial court's verdict was sustained, the parties might
reach a reasonable settlement before the plaintiffs second suit, thus saving
valuable time and "needless litigation.""
In Russell v. Amerisure Ins. Co., the court reiterated the necessity of
resolving the underlying claim before bringing a cause of action against the

686

Jd. at 259.

687

Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 259.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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406 S.E.2d 470 (1991).
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Id. at470.
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Id. at 471.
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Id.
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Robinson, 406 S.E.2d at 47 1.
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87

insurer.""8 The third party plaintiff in Russell dealt directly with the insurer
Amerisure, without the assistance of an attorney. 99 Her only expense-related
evidence was for $176." 0 Amerisure sent her a check for $700, which she returned
uncashed7 ' Russell filed a complaint against Amerisure, alleging that the insurer
violated West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(9). "'7 Russell alleged that Amerisure
committed five unfair claims settlement practices in her case.70 0 The court held that
Russell could not sue the insurer until the underlying suit was ultimately
resolved.'" Russell had not sued the other driver at all, and action against the other
driver was by that time barred by the statute of limitations." 5 Russell stated that it
was Amerisure's fault that she did not bring an underlying suit against the other
driver.7" She alleged that the insurer had also neglected to inform her of the twoyear statute of limitations on her claim and had purposely delayed communications
with her until the statute of limitations was about to lapse.7 7 She did not produce
evidence that the insurer had done so, however, and Amerisure denied committing
any malfeasance.7 8 The court considered allowing Russell to sue under a theory of
common-law fraud, as allowed in several other jurisdictions when an insurer's
malfeasance allowed a statute of limitations to run.70 However, Russell had not
produced even "a scintilla of evidence" to support a theory of common-law
fraud.7" ' The court did not discuss whether it would ever allow such a theory, but
implied that it might."' Therefore, the suit against the insurer would have to be
stayed pending the ultimate resolution of the underlying claim, even though the
underlying claim was time-barred, unless evidence showed that the insurer
fraudulently kept the claimant from suing until the statute of limitations had run.7" '

699

433 S.E.2d 532 (1993).

699

Id. at 533
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Id.
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Id.

702

Id.
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Russell, 433 S.E.2d at 533.
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Id. at 533.
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Id. at 534-35.
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The last case was State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden.13
The plaintiff had sued Wendy's Restaurant for his injuries in a slip-and- fall
accident."" He later amended his complaint to join State Farm as a defendant.7 5
The complaint against State Farm included bad faith and violations of West
Virginia Code sections 33-11-4(3), 33-1 1-4(5)(a) and (b), and 33-1 1-4(9)(d), (f),
(g), and (in).716 Judge Madden allowed joinder of the underlying suit and the third
party claims against the insurer.717 State Farm appealed.718 The court decided that
joinder of the insurer with the insured would be allowed.7" The decision overruled
Jenkins, Robinson, and Russell." ° The two suits would have to be bifurcated 21' to
prevent the jury in the underlying case from hearing testimony concerning
insurance coverage.' Further, discovery against the insurer would also be stayed
pending resolution of the underlying claim." The court expressly stated that "[tio
the extent that the majority of states follow the rule that a party bringing a personal
injury action against an insured may not sue the insurer until after having obtained
judgment against the insured, we are consciously taking a step in a different
direction." 24 It based its holding on Rule 18(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, " which provides that "[a] party asserting a claim to relief... may join
...as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party." 7 As
long as the two suits were bifurcated, there would be no prejudice toward any of
the defendants, and joinder of the two suits would help cut the costs of litigation,
particularly filing fees.727
Prior to Madden, the plaintiff would have to wait not only for the trial
court's decision, but also for the resolution of any and all appeals before bringing a

713

451 S.E.2d 721 (1994).

714

Id. at 723.
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Id. at 723 n.1.
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Id.
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Id. at 723.
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Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 724.
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Id. at 725.
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Id.
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cause of action against the insurer. n8 Since Madden, however, the underlying
liability claim and the third party claim against the insurer may be brought jointly,
as long as the two causes of action are bifurcated. 9 The advantages to the plaintiff
are great. Obviously, the plaintiff not only saves the cost of filing two separate
suits, but also avoids the case being removed to federal court.
Sequential Step Two: Violation of the Statute

2.

The second sequential step in a third party claim under West Virginia Code
section 33-11-4(9) is proof of violation of the statute. Although sub-paragraphs (a),
(b). (c), (d), (f), (1), (in), and (n) all apply to third party claims, most causes of
action brought against insurance companies have been for violation of subsection
(f), "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.""73 Every
third party case heard by the West Virginia court has involved subsection (f). This
step is quite simple. The plaintiff must introduce some evidence that the insurance
company violated a prohibition contained in one or more of the eight applicable
sub-paragraphs. For example, if the plaintiff were relying on a violation of subparagraph (a), the plaintiff could show that the insurer lied to the plaintiff about the
defendant's liability limits. Similarly, if the plaintiff were relying on a violation of
sub-paragraph (b), the plaintiff could show that the insurer refused to return the
plaintiff's phone calls and refused to try to settle the plaintiffs claim against the
defendant/insured.
The most troublesome sub-paragraph is (f). The term "good faith" has not
been defined by the court, nor has the court specified when "liability becomes
reasonably clear." We will define these terms in Part V.
In Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,"3 the plaintiff charged that
Nationwide violated West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(9) by not attempting in
good faith "to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of plaintiff's
claim, even though liability was reasonably clear on the part of its insured; and
failed to promptly provide a reasonable explanation to plaintiff for the basis of its
' The claims were based on sub-paragraphs (f)
offer of a compromise settlement." 732
and (n) of 33-11-4(9)." Nationwide had failed to settle with the plaintiff for over
two years," even failing to settle when the two parties were only $1,000 apart.7 35
M

728

See Robinson, 406 S.E.2d at 470.
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See Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 724.

730

W. VA. CODE § 33-1
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491 S.E.2d I(W. Va. 1996).
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Id. at 5.
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Id. at 9.
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This failure to settle violated the statute because it was evidence that Nationwide
did not attempt in good faith to "effectuate a prompt fair and equitable settlement"
of Dodrill's claim.736
3.

Sequential Step Three: Committed With Such Frequency as to
Indicate a General Business Practice

The third sequential step in a cause of action under West Virginia's Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act is that the insurance company violated the Act
"with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice." 73'The statute
itself does not define frequency.739 However, in Jenkins, the court not only insisted
that frequency must be proved, but then 3defined frequency as "more than a single
isolated violation," or more extensively,
[p]roof of several breaches by an insurance company of W. Va.
Code, 33-1 1-4(9), would be sufficient to establish the indication
of a general business practice. It is possible that multiple
violations of W. Va. Code, 33-1 1-4(9), occurring in the same
claim would be sufficient, since the term "frequency" in the
statute must relate not only to repetition of the same violation but
to the occurrence of different violations."
Russell refined the definition of frequency." The plaintiff in Russell
argued that she had "identified and pleaded five distinct violations of [the Act].""4 2
The court found, however, that "the factual basis for each of these violations is the
same isolated scenario and does not suffice to represent a 'general business
practice.' 74 3 In Dodrill, the court held that frequency could be shown by the
repetition of the same violation or of different violations.7' The plaintiff would
have to show more than a single violation to recover. 45 Several breaches would be
735

Id. at 8.

736

Dodrill, 491 S.E.2d at 12.

737

W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996) (emphasis added).

738

Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 252.
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Id.at 260.
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sufficient, however, even if they occurred in the same claim.7"6 To find evidence of
multiple violations, plaintiffs could look to other claimants or other persons
familiar with the insurer's business practices. The list of factors is not exhaustive,
but in Dodrill,the court held that in the settlement of a single insurance claim, the
evidence should establish that
the conduct in question constitutes more than a single violation of
33-11-4(9), that the violations arise from separate, discrete acts or
omissions in the claim settlement, and that they arise from a habit,
custom, usage, or business policy of the insurer, so that, viewing
the conduct as a whole, the finder of fact is able to conclude that
the practice or practices are sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently
sanctioned by the insurance company that the conduct can be
considered a "general business practice" and can be distinguished
by fair minds from an isolated event.74
In a subsequent unpublished federal case, Cross v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co.,7"8 the plaintiffs case against the insurer had been dismissed at
the district court level because all of the violations arose from a single case, her
own. n9 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing Dodril150
In West Virginia, frequency which constitutes a general business practice
can be shown by either the insurance company's frequent violation of one or more
sections of the Act in different cases, or the company's multiple violations of the
Act in one particular claim."' The successful completion of sequential steps 1, 2,
and 3 constitutes a complete cause of action. The plaintiff is entitled to damages for
aggravation and inconvenience, emotional anguish, chagrin, depression,
disappointment, embarrassment, fear, fright, grief, horror, humiliation, shame,
worry, attorney's fees, costs, excess over policy limits, expenses, loss of
consortium, and net economic loss.752 Attorney's fees and costs are determined at a
post-trial hearing.753
4.

Sequential Step Four: Actual Malice.

748

Russell, 433 S.E.2d at 536.

747

Dodrill, 491 S.E.2d at 3 Syl. Pt. 4.
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No. 96-1241, 1996 WL 742389 (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1996).

749

Id.
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Id.
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See Dodrill,491 S.E.2d at 13.
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See id.
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See, e.g., Landmark Baptist Church v. Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co., 484 S.E.2d 195 (W. Va. 1997).
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The fourth sequential step in a cause of action under the Act involves proof
of actual malice. Punitive damages may then be recovered." The insurer must have
actually known that the claim was proper and must have willfully, maliciously, and
intentionally used unfair business practices in settling or denying a claim.7" This is
intended to be a bright-line standard.7 Jenkins indicated that punitive damages
may be available in a statutory claim, but did not elaborate.7 7 The key case on
willful, malicious, and intentional conduct (the old standard) is Poling v. Motorist's
Mut. Ins. Co.. 7 8 Willful, malicious, and intentional conduct is defined as when the
insurer "knew [that the plaintiff s] claim was proper and willfully, maliciously, and
intentionally delayed payment in order to attempt to obtain a less than just
settlement."7 9 Willful, malicious, and intentional conduct may also be found where
the insurer knew that the plaintiffs claim was proper and willfully, wantonly, and
intentionally denied payment.7 ' This standard, though substantially unchanged, is
now referred to by the court as actual malice. If the finder of fact determines that
the insurer's conduct was that of actual malice, punitive damages are then
available.
M

VI. OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO RECOVERY

A.

Bifurcation

After State ex rel. State Farm v. Madden,6 suits may be joined, but claims
against the insured must be bifurcated from claims against the insurer. 2 "Under
Rule 18(b), W.V.R.C.P. [1978], an insurer may be joined as a defendant with the
insured by an injured plaintiff alleging claims of bad faith and unfair insurance
practices." 763 To prevent undue prejudice to the defendant insured, however, "any

754

See, e.g., Dodrill,491 S.E.2d 1.

See Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., Co., 381 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va.1989); see also Poling,450
S.E.2d at 635. Further, in McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1998), the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals indicated that this actual malice standard was the standard for first party statutory
insurance misconduct cases. The author assumes that the Court would apply that standard to third party
statutory insurance misconduct cases as well, given that the statutes and elements making up the two causes
of action are substantially the same.
755
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Id.
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See Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 259 n. 12.
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450 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1994).
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Id. at 638.
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discovery or additional actions against the insurer ...

must be stayed pending

resolution of the underlying suit."' The decision in Madden was a conscious step
in a different direction from the majority of states."' Allowing the insurer to be
joined in the action with the insured prevents removal. If the plaintiff is a West
Virginia citizen and the only defendant is an out-of-state insurance company, the
insurance company can often have the case removed to federal court. Assuming the
insured is also a West Virginia citizen, joining the two suits defeats complete
diversity. Therefore, the case cannot be removed.7"
B.

Discovery
1.

Timing

Under Madden, although suits may be joined, discovery must be stayed
pending resolution of the underlying claim. 7 This prevents prejudice to the
insurer.76 Allowing a plaintiff to instigate extensive discovery would entail
allowing requests for the insurance company's claim file." "It is entirely possible
that the contents of the insurance company's claim file would prejudice [the
insured's] case."' " It is possible that the court might restrict production of
documents if the defendant so moved. 7 ' More than likely, it would still prejudice
the defendant's case to allow the two causes of action to be tried together. "2 Having
insurance at all is enough to prejudice the defendant's case "because disclosure
might influence the jury to decide the underlying claim based on the fact of
insurance coverage, and not on the merits of the case."'
2.

Scope

Proving that an insurer's violations of the act were committed with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice requires extensive discovery. In
some cases, such as Dodrill, a single claim may have enough violations occurring
764

Id. at 724.

765

Id. at 725.

766

28 U.S.C. §1441(b) (1994).

767

Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 724.
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Id.

769

Id.at 726.

770

Id. (citing Robinson, 406 S.E.2d at 471.)

771

Id.
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Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 726.
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Id. (citing Hewett v. Frye, 401 S.E.2d 222 (1990)).
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to show frequency." In other cases, however, the claimant will seek to show that
the insurer committed multiple violations in several claims."5 In State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stephens," the plaintiff requested that the insurer "provide
information on every claim filed against it, nationwide, since 1980 which involved
allegations of bad faith, unfair trade practices violations, excess verdict liability or
inquiries from insurance company regulators concerning State Farm's handling of
claims." 7 This request for twelve years of documents was simply too burdensome.
The court held that although it was important for the claimant to establish
frequency, it would not allow unduly burdensome and oppressive discovery." It
limited discovery to other similar claims filed in West Virginia. "7
The problems of extensive discovery may be answered, at least in part, if
West Virginia adopts the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, as
amended in 1990 by the NAIC.78 ° The NAIC has amended the Act to include
violations committed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice
or violations "committed flagrantly and in conscious disregard of this Act or any
rules promulgated hereunder."7 ' Under the amended Act, if the claimant shows
that the violation was flagrant and in conscious disregard of the Act, there would be
no need to go through burdensome discovery.
C.

Damages

Damages awarded depend on which sequential steps the plaintiff has
successfully achieved. Damages awarded upon completion of step one are the
policy proceeds. If the plaintiff completes step three, he may be awarded damages
for aggravation and inconvenience, mental anguish, depression, disappointment,
embarrassment, fear, fright, grief, horror, humiliation, shame, and worry.782 In
addition, the plaintiff may be able to recover attorney's fees, court costs, excess
over policy limits, expenses, loss of consortium, and net economic loss.7" Upon
completion of step four, the plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages."'
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1.

Fees and Court Costs

If the insurer's misconduct is found to have been a "general business
practice" under sequential step 3, the claimant may be awarded attorney's fees and
costs as determined in a post-trial hearing and awarded by the judge.78 The judge
will use the test from Landmark Baptist8 . to determine if these fees and costs are
reasonable. The test consists of broad factors:
1) the time and labor required, 2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions, 3) the skill required to perform the legal services
properly, 4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney
due to the acceptance of the case, 5) the customary fee, 6) whether
the fee is fixed or contingent, 7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances, 8) the amount involved and the results
obtained, 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys, 10) the undesirability of the case, 11) the nature and
relationship with the client, and 12)
length of the professional
7 87
cases.
similar
in
awards
2.

Punitive Damages

Upon completion of sequential step four, willful, malicious, or intentional
conduct, the plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages.788 The punitive damages
instruction in Dodrillwas as follows:
1) [P]unitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the
harm that is likely to occur from defendant's conduct, as well as to
the harm that actually has occurred. If the defendant's actions
caused or would likely cause, in a similar situation, only slight
harm, the damages should be relatively small. If the harm is
grievous, then the damages should be much greater.
2) You may consider the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct.
And in doing so, you should take into account how long defendant
continued in its actions, whether they were aware that their actions
were causing or were likely to cause harm, whether they attempted
785
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to conceal or cover up their actions or the harm caused by them,
whether they often engaged in similar conduct in the past, and
whether they have made reasonable efforts to make amends by
offering a fair and prompt settlement for the actual harm caused
once their liability became clear to them. 89
3.

Prepayment

"Payment for [undisputed elements of a claim] shall be made ...

where

such payment can be made without prejudice to either party." ' The question is
whether and when such payments prejudice a party. In Cross, the insurer had been
paying the claimant's medical bills and had offered $1200 to settle her claim."'
When the claimant hired a lawyer, the insurer refused to make any more payments
for lost wages or medical bills.792 The parties finally settled for $35,000."'3 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that "it would have prejudiced [the insurer] to continue
paying Cross' medical bills and lost wages without any adjudication of liability or
the extent of Cross' damages." "
VII. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS/ THE FUTURE

Sub-paragraph (f) of the Act defines as an unfair claim settlement practice
"[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.""79 This sub-paragraph is
the workhorse of the Act. Because most claims filed under the Act have referred to
sub-paragraph (f), it is important to define the terms that cause the most litigation:
good faith and reasonably clear.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not defined good faith or
bad faith. In other courts, good faith has been generally defined as "a state of mind
denoting honesty of purpose and freedom from intention to defraud.""7 Also,
"[g]ood faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition. It encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
789

Id. at 14.
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absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage."7"' Many times, good faith is defined as a lack of bad
faith:
"[b]ad faith" as the opposite of "good faith," generally implying
or involving actual or constructive fraud, or design to mislead or
deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or
some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as
to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister
motive."9 8
In insurance cases in particular, courts have also attempted to decide what
qualifies as good faith. The Maryland District Court has held that to qualify as
having acted in good faith when refusing to settle a claim within policy limits, an
insurer is generally required to weigh the interests of the insured, at least equally
with its own.799 New Jersey also has used this test of balancing the insurer's interest
with that of the insured. " The New Jersey Superior Court also stated that good
faith requires that, under the circumstances of the particular case, a decision not to
settle must be a thoroughly honest, intelligent, and objective one and realistic when
tested by the necessarily assumed expertise of the carrier, and where the carrier
recognizes the probability that an adverse verdict will exceed the policy limits, "the
boundaries of 'good faith' become more compressed in favor of the insured." ' In
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has used factors to decide if an insurer failed to
settle in good faith. These included reasonable valuation of the case and whether, at
each stage, proposed settlements were rejected consciously in terms of deliberative
judgment evaluations or because of other or no reasons." 2
Again, the court has not defined when liability becomes reasonably clear.
In Massachusetts, the Appellate Court held that whether an insurer's liability has
become reasonably clear is a question for the fact finder." 3 The fact finder must
determine whether a "reasonable person, with knowledge of relevant facts and law,
would probably have concluded, for good reason, that the insurer was liable to the
plaintiff." "',
It should be apparent that instead of restricting private causes of action
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against insurers, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been liberalizing
the requirements. First, the underlying cause of action and the claim against the
insurer are now allowed to be joined as long as the two are bifurcated." 5 Second,
the court has broadened the requirement of frequency to include violations
committed in multiple cases as well as multiple violations committed in a single
case.8" If West Virginia adopts the NAIC's revised Model Act of 1990, the
claimant will no longer have to prove frequency if he can show that the violation
was committed flagrantly and in conscious disregard of the Act or any rules
promulgated hereunder. Although few states have adopted the Act, as amended in
1990,"' 7 the new language is in keeping with West Virginia's liberal interpretation
of its Act. As the Act now reads, it would not matter how egregious a violation
was, as long as the insurer did not commit it frequently. Because West Virginia has
already found that multiple violations in a single claim suffice to show sufficient
frequency to indicate a general business practice, 8 it is a small step to do away
with that requirement altogether upon proof that the violation was flagrant.
Perhaps the definitions of good faith and reasonably clear liability will be
clarified in the future. If not, they will continue to be litigation breeders. West
Virginia is unlikely to follow California's course and overrule Jenkins. " Although
California's reasons for overruling Royal Globe apply to any state, Royal Globe
was overturned ten years ago, while Jenkins has been precedent for sixteen years.
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